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Agency issues are inherent to every kind of organization and are able to negatively affect 
companies’ profitability as well as the correct functioning of capital markets. The board of 
directors has always been considered a powerful governance instrument able to mitigate such 
issues. Particularly, growing relevance has been attributed to minority directors: their 
representation is crucial to protect and safeguard their interests and to enhance board diversity. 
Hence, this thesis investigates the Italian minority shareholder representation system within 
board of directors. Specifically, it focuses on the analysis of minority shareholder 
representatives with the aim of assessing whether they can qualify as “diverse”. The analysed 
data, regarding 40 Italian listed companies and 462 candidates to the board, do not provide 
evidence of significant differences among majority and minority candidates’ profiles. However, 
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Agency problems arise frequently in every kind of organization involving subjects with 
different objective functions. Agency issues within corporations have been traditionally 
distinguished in two types. The former, defined as agency problem type I is more frequent to 
arise in corporations characterized by highly dispersed ownership structures, in which there is 
a clear separation between ownership and control, in other words, a sharp distinction between 
management and shareholders. The latter, instead, defined as agency problem type II, regards 
potential conflict which could arise between different types of shareholders, and it is more 
frequent for concentrated ownership structures, where there is a large controlling shareholder 
who can use its control power to abuse and expropriate minorities.  
 
Beside the specific type of agency problem, corporations have always tried to address and 
mitigate those conflicts, given that they, by creating additional costs, can damage shareholder 
wealth and in turn company profitability and value. Negative consequences arising from agency 
conflict do not regard only firm performance, but particularly for listed companies, they are 
able to affect capital markets. When conflict between shareholders are significant, investors, 
traditionally representing minority shareholders, might be reluctant to provide financial 
resources, given the potentiality of expropriation or abuse by controlling owners. Hence, agency 
costs mitigation is not only relevant to improve company performance, but also to further 
develop and enhance financial markets functioning.  
 
Indeed, there are several mechanisms companies can adopt to relief from these problems: the 
most relevant are represented by the board of directors and minority protections schemes. 
Dealing with boards and minority protections, one relevant and fundamental way of mitigating 
agency conflicts between shareholders is given by the possibility of allowing minority 
representation as well as their active participation within boards of directors. Furthermore, it is 
important to underline that minority representation within boards does not only represent a 
useful mechanism to safeguard minority interests, but also a way of increasing board diversity 
and in turn board effectiveness.  
 
Besides their relevance, minority representation provisions and measures are not implemented 
by all jurisdictions. Anyway, the Italian institutional setting provides for a unique system of 
minority representation within governance structures, defined as list voting. Since 2005, 
minority shareholders have granted the right to propose their representatives within board of 
directors, more specifically, the law requires that at least one director should be appointed from 
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minority shareholders representatives. In other words, this legal requirement, compulsory for 
listed companies, allows for a more active minority participation as well as for a more diverse 
composition of the board, which consequently is not only representative of controlling owners’ 
interests but rather of the whole pool of shareholders.  
 
The scope of this thesis is to investigate the implementation of list voting procedures across 
Italian listed companies, in order to assess in what circumstances minority chose to exercise 
this fundamental right. Furthermore, given that the list voting provision allow to make a clear 
distinction between minority and majority representatives, the aim of the analysis conducted is 
to provide evidence regarding potential differences between majority and minority candidates’ 
profiles, and whether these differences are able to affect company performance.  
 
In order to provide an answer to the above questions, the first chapter provides a more detailed 
analysis of common agency problems within corporations, with a more specific focus on agency 
problems type II and related protections mechanisms: board of directors and minority rights.  
Then, the second chapter focuses on board of directors’ composition, and related minority 
representation mechanisms, with a specific description of the Italian institutional setting. 
Finally, the third and fourth chapters describe the analysis conducted on a sample of 40 Italian 
listed companies, with the objective of assessing list voting implementation and whether 
















Chapter 1- Agency theory: problems and protections  
 
1.1 Agency theory and corporate governance 
Agency relations, as well as consequent agency problems, arise in “all organizations and in all 
cooperative efforts involving two or more people” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The agency 
can be defined as a legal relationship shaped through a binding contract between two parties: 
the principal and the agent. In the mentioned relation, the principal empowers the agent to act 
on its behalf for the pursuing of contractually defined objectives. If the established objectives 
are the ones which maximize both parties’ utilities, there are good reasons to believe that the 
agent will act in the best interest of the principal. If, instead, the parties’ interests are not aligned, 
there is obviously the incentive for each party to maximize its personal utility. Hence, given the 
mis-alinement of interests, it is possible to observe what in literature has been defined as the 
“agency theory” (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The agency issue involves the rising of related 
costs, referred to as agency costs. According to Jensen and Meckling, it is possible to identify 
three major kinds of agency costs. The first two are: monitoring expenditures, sustained by the 
principal to put in place control and evaluation mechanisms of the agent activities; bonding 
costs, sustained by the agent to guarantee he will not act against principal interests. In addition, 
also in cases of positive monitoring and bonding costs, there will still be a discrepancy of 
interests between the two parties. This will consequently determine a significant divergence 
between agent’s decision and the optimal decision from the principal perspective. Thus, the 
reduction of wealth that the principal must sustain is identified as the third kind of agency cost: 
the residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
Agency issues and related costs are closely linked to corporate governance: they are defined as 
the problems corporate governance tries to address (Love 2010). Within this context, it also 
appears fundamental to provide a definition of corporate governance. It has been defined as the 
“system by which companies are directed and controlled”, more specifically, it “involves a set 
of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives 
of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance 
are determined” (OECD 2015, G20/Principles of Corporate Governance, p.9). Hence, it is 
considered as the set of rules, mechanism and structures, whose main purpose is regulating the 
existent relations between various company’s stakeholders, by minimizing potential agency 
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costs and by promoting behaviours and decisions which can enhance the creation of economic 
value for the company.  
 
1.2 Agency problem type I: principal-agent paradigm 
When the general agency theory, previously defined, is applied to corporations, the principal-
agent paradigm can be found in the relation between shareholders and management, indeed 
defined as a “pure agency relationship” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
This association was based on the crucial assumption of the separation of ownership and 
control: viewed as non-coincidence between decisions and risk bearing functions (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). The issue of ownership and control separation has been also addressed by Adam 
Smith in 1776 as well as by Berle and Means in 1932. The latter, by looking at the United States 
context, provide a definition of the modern corporation structure, basically characterized by a 
dispersed ownership among shareholders, which automatically lead to concentrate the control 
and administration functions in the hands of management (La Porta et al., 1999). From this 
perspective, management is in charge of the decision-making process and of general 
administrative functions, while shareholders, representing the company owners and residual 
claimants, sustain all the risks related to the business activities, however lacking the possibility 
of directly control and govern the corporation.  
    
According to this view, the general agency problem applied to corporations can be expressed 
as a classical misalignment of interests between management and shareholders. Shareholders 
(the principals) confer the direction of the company to managers (the agent), which should 
manage the company with the last and fundamental objective of maximizing shareholders 
value. However, and that is where the agency issue arises, managers may have their own 
interests conflicting with the ones of shareholders, thus they might be tempted to only achieve 
personal benefits. Conflicting interests are mainly driven by their different views on the 
business. Owners are interested in the maximization of value creation and consequently in the 
economic growth of the company in the long run. Managers, instead, might be willing to pursue 
different objectives which might lead to the achievement of monetary and non-monetary 
personal benefits: such as the rise of personal power, or the achievement of higher salaries and 
compensation. Given the misalignment of interests and the actual impossibility for shareholders 
of directly control management actions, the previously defined agency costs might arise, indeed 
potentially reducing shareholder wealth as well as firm value.  
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1.3 The principal-principal agency problem  
The agency theory, as previously defined in terms of principal-agent paradigm, has been 
dominant in the economic literature during the last four decades (Denozza and Stabilini, 2017). 
However, there are more recent studies and researches which firmly believe that the principal-
agent paradigm offers a reductive description of the problems and related agency costs which 
could arise within organizations.  
 
Firstly, the extent to which corporations are characterized by dispersed ownership structures 
has been questioned by several studies. For instance, Holderness and Sheehan (1988), have 
found majority controlling shareholders also in several United States public companies (La 
Porta et al., 1999). Furthermore, focusing on economic contexts different from the one of the 
United States, or more generally, outside the Anglo-Saxon world, widely held firms might be 
considered only a minority. By analysing organizational forms in continental Europe, as well 
as in emerging economies, it is possible to observe that corporations have rather concentrated 
ownership structures, characterized by large controlling shareholders which can be identified 
by the Government, as well as by families and financial and non-financial institutions (La Porta 
et al., 1999). Particularly, an increasing number of firms seems to be controlled by families, 
either directly or indirectly, through control mechanisms which involve other corporations and 
thus, pyramidal structures. For instance, in India about 70% of firms are family controlled, 
while Brazil accounts for over 4 million family owned businesses. Shifting our attention to 
continental Europe, countries like Germany, France and Italy as well, are traditionally 
characterized by concentrated ownership structure, in which family owned business appears to 
be the greatest majority (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010).   
 
Secondly, the agency theory is closely linked with the shareholder value paradigm, according 
to which the last and ultimate objective that management should pursue is the maximization of 
the value of the firm for its shareholders. The major explanation to this principle is that 
shareholders are considered as the provider of risk capital, thus, they represent the residual 
claimants of a firm’s assets. Being residual claimants, pursuing their interests also ensure 
protection and satisfaction of the interests of other relevant company stakeholders, whose 
claims are, by definition, preferred (Denozza and Stabilini, 2017). Consequently, the 
maximization of shareholder value becomes the firm objective function assigned to company 
management. However, this view starts from the critical assumption that shareholders are all 




When the ideas that company ownership is concentrated and that company shareholders are 
different and might have conflicting interests, are accepted, the agency theory as traditionally 
shaped becomes limited. Thus, it seems appropriate to expand the traditional view of the agency 
problem, also considering the relevance and importance of what in literature has been defined 
as a second type of agency conflict: the principal-principal problem.  
 
The principal-principal agency problem focuses on the goal incongruences between different 
types of principals (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). Secondary agency problems are always based on 
interests’ divergence, where the involved parties are not management and shareholders, but 
rather different kind of shareholders. Thus, in this case, the crucial point is not the one of 
aligning shareholders and management interests, incentivizing the latter to act in the best 
interest of the former, anymore. The focus instead, is on how to account for the diverging 
interests of different groups of shareholders and how to make them converge in the corporation 
objective-function (Denozza and Stabilini, 2017).  
 
Even if the attention to second type of agency conflicts is a recent phenomenon, the existent 
literature has proven the extensive spread of such conflicts. Indeed, they could arise to some 
degree in all corporations, regardless of their ownership and governance structures as well as 
of their operating economic environment. For instance, their presence has been documented 
both in emerging and already developed economies, as well as in firms characterized by 
different ownership structures, where the major shareholder might be represented by families, 
institutions or even by governments (Sutton et al., 2017).  
 
1.3.1 Majority and minority shareholders 
Even though principal-principal agency conflicts could arise in all corporations, they are most 
frequent and most severe in firms characterized by concentrated ownership and by fewer legal 
protection for minorities (Young et al., 2008). In fact, if from one side the concentrated 
ownership structure can mitigate the traditional principal-agent problem, from the other, it may 
lead to conflict between different kind of shareholders (Renders and Garemynck, 2012).  
Considering different types of principals, the most relevant distinction that can be identified is 
the one between majority and minority shareholders.  
According to a general and simple definition, minority shareholders are all shareholders 
different from the controlling one. A controlling or majority shareholder can be identified as a 
person or entity that owns and control more than 50% of the company outstanding shares. In 
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the opposite view, minority shareholders are identified as those persons or entities who own 
less than such percentage of the corporation total shares. Given the traditional principle of “one 
share-one vote”, by controlling more than half of the outstanding shares, controlling 
shareholders also own the majority of the voting rights of a company. Thus, they can actively 
influence the company’s decisions and operations. On the other hand, given the reduced portion 
of outstanding shares owned, minority shareholders do not exercise control over a corporation.  
 
Anyway, the difference between these two kinds of principals, does not solely rely on the 
different portion of share capital and voting power owned, their major difference is represented 
by their contrasting views on the business. Traditionally, majority shareholders are identified 
as the founders of the firm or as the ones who assume the economic initiative, thus are generally 
animated by a strong entrepreneurial sense. While, minority shareholders are generally 
represented by investors. The latter are individuals or entities who are interested in allocating 
their financial resources in order to obtain a certain return, represented by company dividends, 
or by a capital gain achieved through the selling of their ownership stake. Given their prevailing 
economic interest, generally they are not interested in influencing company activities: indeed, 
they typically do not participate general assembly, neither exercise their voting power. Investors 
are said to be characterized by “rational apathy”: because of the lacked possibility of influence 
company decisions, they choose to be inactive, only searching for a positive return upon their 
investment. Thus, from one side the interest in influencing and running company activities and 
from the other, the aim of obtaining an immediate economic return.  
 
However, some authors believe that it is not possible to shape a unique concept or definition 
for minorities. There, instead, exist different typologies of minorities across jurisdictions and 
across companies as well. In addition, the concept of minority cannot be considered completely 
defined, but is rather changing according to the evolution of the social-economic system in 
which corporations implement their activities (Campobasso, 2014).  
For instance, in some jurisdictions, specifically in continental Europe, it is very frequent that 
employees own company shares, and are indeed qualified as minority shareholders. Thus, from 
this perspective company minorities are not only represented by investors.  
At the same time, also the concept of investors has been subject to significant changes during 
the last decades. Minorities are nowadays represented by a new category of investors: 
institutional investors. This category is quite broad, and it includes insurance and investment 
companies, banks and other financial intermediaries, several type of funds such as pension, 
mutual, hedge and private equity funds. Besides the several and different typologies of 
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institutional investors, they can be defined as professional figures and entities, who generally 
own minority stakes within companies, but actively participate company decision-making 
process, in order to protect and satisfy their interests, thus also ensuring the achievement of a 
higher and better return of their investment.  Thanks to the spread of this new figure, investors 
do not qualify as mere consumers of financial instruments anymore. They are not only 
interested in the achievement of a certain monetary return, they are rather interested in company 
activities and operations. They are committed to company growth and expansion; indeed, they 
actively participate company life by directly exercising their rights and performing their related 
duties. In these terms, the typical investor apathy is rather translated into activism: they make 
clear their interests and positions, also assuming contrasting views with respect to controlling 
shareholders (Campobasso, 2014).   
 
1.3.2 Minority expropriation and private benefits of control 
Whatever the type of minority or majority shareholder, the divergence of interests between 
principals may determine agency problems and costs to arise. In these cases, firms may be 
exposed to the problem of tunnelling. It has been defined as the “transfer of resources out of a 
company to its controlling shareholders” (Johnson et al., 2000). According to Johnson et al. 
(2000) view, tunnelling activities can come in two different forms: through self-dealing 
transactions or through dilutive activities. With self-dealing transactions, a controlling 
shareholder directly transfer resources out of the company. Such transactions might include 
illegal activities, such as outright theft or fraud; or legal ones such as excessive and above 
market compensation of executives, diversion of resources, asset transfers at arbitrary prices, 
cheap loans and guarantees. Dilutive activities, instead, do not require the direct transfer of 
resources, but are equally able to increase controlling shareholder wealth by the issuance of 
shares at dilutive prices, minority freeze-outs, insider trading, creeping acquisitions and any 
other kind of activity able to discriminate minorities. 
 
Another frequent problem is the one of entrenchment, that results in a situation in which there 
is a strong link between the company management and the controlling shareholder. In this case, 
it is highly probable that the management group will run the company in the sole personal 
interest of majority shareholders. In more extreme cases, company executives and top 
management figures might be directly represented by majority shareholders. In such a case, 
even if the management might be incompetent and unskilled, it cannot be easily removed; thus, 
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creating possible inefficiencies and a high potential for damage to firm value (Morck et al, 
2005).  
 
In both situations, dominant shareholders might use their power and their position of control, 
in order to obtain what in literature has been defined as “private benefits of control”. One of the 
most recent definition of private benefits of control has been provided by Coffee (2001). 
According to his view, private benefits are “all of the ways in which those in control of a 
corporation can siphon off benefits to themselves”, without sharing those benefits with the other 
shareholders (Ehrhardt and Nowak, 2001). The economic literature generally distinguishes 
across two major typologies of private benefits of control: pecuniary and non-pecuniary ones. 
Benefits of control arising through the previously mentioned self-dealing transactions and 
dilutive activities are pecuniary since they directly or indirectly affect shareholder’s wealth. 
More precisely, they increase the one of controlling shareholders while are detrimental for 
minorities. Besides this first category, it is crucial to consider also non-pecuniary benefits of 
control. These are defined as “amenities” and “reputation” and are linked to non-monetary 
aspects which are also able to generate utility: personal relations, physical appointment of the 
office, social prestige and power and the possibility of influencing public opinion (Ehrhardt and 
Nowak, 2001). Apart from the specific functions and characteristics of the above examples, the 
common and crucial aspect is that some value is not shared equally among shareholders in 
proportion of the shares owned, instead, it is only captured by the controlling party, hence, the 
definition of “private benefit of control” (Dyck and Zingales, 2004).  
 
In these terms, the major issue is related to the incentive of controlling owners to deviate from 
the maximization of the total value of the firm and to take instead decisions only with the aim 
of maximize their private benefits. Indeed, the ultimate result of such behaviours translates in 
the possibility of minority expropriation. When controlling shareholders expropriate minorities, 
by using company resources and activities only to pursue private benefits, it is possible to 
observe a double effect: on one hand, minority shareholders are worsen-off by facing actual 
losses; on the other hand, the entire company might be penalized by potential suboptimal 
decisions implemented by controlling shareholders. Indeed, with the aim of preventing the 
occurrence of minority expropriation and related negative consequences, legal measures 




1.4 Minority shareholder protection  
Until the 1970s, only Anglo-Saxon countries had implemented legal framework able to 
effectively protect minority shareholders. However, in the last three decades, the adoption of 
legal protections has interested also the rest of the world. This trend was mainly inspired by the 
general idea that “financial markets allocate capital efficiently and to the benefit of the economy 
at large” (Guillen and Capron, 2016). Thus, from this point of view, it becomes crucial the idea 
that the government should provide protection to minority shareholders as a direct way to help 
companies raising financial resources, essential for running their activities and to further 
expand, thus also improving the whole country economic system.  
 
Besides the common trend of increasing minority shareholder protection rules, there exist 
differences across countries in types or protective law implemented as well as in the quality of 
its enforcement. La Porta and al., (1998), by empirically analysing shareholders jurisdiction in 
49 countries, proved that laws significantly vary across countries, mainly because of differences 
in their legal origin and tradition. More specifically, common law countries, identified with the 
Anglo-Saxon world, provide minority shareholders with better and stronger protection. While, 
civil law countries, especially the ones influenced by the French legal tradition, the weakest. 
From what concerns the quality of law enforcement, it appears to be the highest in Scandinavian 
and German civil law countries, while being the lowest in French civil law ones (La Porta et 
al., 1998).   
 
However, the issue of minority shareholder protection is of more than historical interest 
(Guillen and Capron, 2016). In fact, it has acquired more and more relevance during the years, 
as companies experimented failures and bankruptcy, culminating with the global financial crisis 
of 2008. During these periods, many countries had to deal with corporate scandals (Enron 2001, 
Parmalat 2003) and with a significant contraction of financial markets, which in turns lead to a 
substantial decrease of shareholder wealth. All these issues pointed out the inefficiency of 
investor protection rules and more generally of corporate governance systems.  
 
In order to cope and to overcome these inefficiencies, new regulations and legal frameworks 
have been issued. A crucial step in the regulative effort made to enhance shareholder’ rights in 
listed companies was the Shareholder Rights Directive 2007/36/EC (recently amended by the 
Directive 2017/828/EU, frequently defined as SHRD II). The cited directive had the general 
objectives of “fostering efficiency and competitiveness of business; developing stock markets 
in the European Union; strengthening shareholders’ rights and third parties’ protection” 
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(Rose, 2012). At the same time, significant emphasis has been placed on “soft” laws, intended 
as not compulsory regulations to which companies can choose to comply with. Particularly, 
Codes of good corporate governance, based on the “comply or explain” mechanism, have been 
created in the last decades all around the world, in order to improve corporate governance 
practices. Again, Anglo-Saxon countries were the first to publish such codes: United States in 
1978, followed by Ireland in 1991, and United Kingdom in 1992 with the influential Cadbury 
Report. Then, by the middle of 2008, 64 counties had issued at least one code regarding 
corporate governance (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Indeed, according to Aguilera 
(2009) the development of these general principles, recognised as “corporate governance best 
practices”, was mainly prompted by transnational institutions, such as the OECD, with the main 
fundamental aim of providing higher qualitative standards concerning company governance. 
They considered good governance as a necessary condition to make companies, and 
consequently countries, grow (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). This idea was considered 
particularly valid for public traded companies which constantly need to attract investors, thus 
creating an effective system of corporate governance able to satisfy and safeguard their 
interests.  
 
1.4.1 Minority shareholders rights 
According to the OECD Corporate Governance principles “corporate governance frameworks 
should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights and ensure the equitable 
treatment of all shareholders, including minority” (OECD, 2015).  
Equity-holders, by owing company shares, are granted a set of equal rights of both 
administrative and proprietary nature. A share, defined as a portion of company ownership, is 
a financial instrument which give the owners the right to receive dividends in case of company 
profits distribution and the right to vote during general shareholder’s meeting and to counsel 
company major documents. However, rights granted to shareholders do not only depend on the 
type of security, but also on the set of legal rules of the country in which securities are issued 
(LLSV 1998). Country level jurisdictions might enhance or restrict, according to specific 
circumstances, shareholder rights. Even though country legal systems can differ a lot – for their 
origin and legal tradition, for their historical background and development, for sources of law 
and related hierarchies, as well as for the specific legal institutions - it is still possible to identify 




As previously mentioned, one of the most important shareholder administrative right is the one 
of voting during shareholder’s meetings for the appointment of directors, financial statement 
approval and major corporate issues. The voting right is directly linked with the share 
ownership, according to the fundamental principle of one share-one vote. This represents the 
base-case in which minority shareholders are considered better protected, since, by owning 
company shares, they also have the possibility of expressing their opinions, thus influencing 
decisions taken during the general assembly (LLSV, 1998).  
 
However, the one share-one vote principle is not the only allowed by company laws. Also, best 
corporate governance practices suggest that all shareholders should have the right to participate 
and vote in the general assembly, but at the same time, they also allow for the possibility of 
issuing different classes of shares. Indeed, it is very frequent, especially for listed companies to 
issue shares which for their specific characteristics alter, by reducing or enlarging, shareholders 
voting power. Main examples are represented by: non-voting shares, which completely lack 
voting rights in both ordinary and extraordinary shareholders meetings, but generally provide 
additional property rights: they are “preferred” in the dividend distribution process;   limited 
and subordinated voting shares, in which the voting right might be limited to certain issues and 
topics, or subordinated to the occurrence of certain conditions; founders’ shares, which are 
generally characterized by multiples voting rights; shares whose voting rights increase if they 
are owned for longer periods. La Porta et al. (1998) found evidence that only 22% of the forty-
nine analysed countries applied the one share-one vote principle, pointing out that it frequent 
for companies to restrict minorities voting power.  
 
Besides the voting right itself, also the way in which this right can be exercised during general 
shareholders meetings is deemed crucial. According to certain jurisdictions, shareholders can 
participate, intervene and vote in the assembly only by physically showing up or through an 
authorized representative. Instead, other countries, allow the intervention as well as voting, also 
by mail or through electronic systems, thus making easier shareholder participation and right’s 
exercise (LLSV, 1998). Moreover, in order to have the opportunity to effectively exercise their 
voting rights, shareholders should always be informed about data, location and agenda of the 
general meetings. The timely disclosure of such information gives them the ability to actively 
participating by asking questions or in some cases also by adding elements they deemed 




Countries’ jurisdictions also give minority shareholders additional rights through which they 
can be relieved by oppressive behaviours of management or controlling shareholders (LLSV, 
1998). These legal mechanisms include: the right to call extraordinary shareholders meetings, 
the right to challenge invalid shareholders resolutions, which might involve decisions taken 
against minority shareholders’ interests; or the right to directly challenge directors also through 
court procedures, generally referred as shareholder’ suits. Some countries also grant 
shareholders the right to buy new issued shares in advance, in order to protect them from 
possible dilution, in the case in which shares are issued below market prices.  
 
Moreover, another fundamental shareholder right is the possibility to elect board members and 
to propose candidates. Generally, many jurisdictions ask for majority voting requirements for 
board election: indeed, majority voting is requested by the 65% of jurisdictions (OECD 
Corporate Governance Factbook, 2019). However, only few countries require the 
implementation of voting mechanisms which allow for a proportional representation on the 
board, thus ensuring and facilitating an effective participation and representation of minorities 
(LLSV, 1998). The main effect of such rules is to provide minority shareholders with the 
possibility of being represented within the administrative structures of the company, thus more 
directly influencing company decisions and operations.  
 
To conclude, many are the measures and mechanisms that can be implemented in order to 
protect minorities. Most of them are specifically required by countries’ laws, in many other 
cases, they might be enforced by corporate charters and bylaws, according to the general 
principle of “statutory autonomy and flexibility”. Hence, not only country level jurisdictions, 
but also firms can directly improve investor protection rights in several ways: by increasing the 
level of disclosure, by selecting well-functioning and independent boards, imposing 
disciplinary mechanisms to prevent minority shareholder expropriation. This also means that 
the level of minority protection might change across firms within the same country (Love 2010). 
 
1.4.2. Minority protection and capital market enhancement  
The introduction of minority protection legislations has been necessary also to foster the 
development and expansion of listed companies and of financial markets. As previously 
underlined, minority shareholders are recognized as company investors, indeed they play the 
crucial role of providers of financial resources to the company, and depending on the type of 
security they own, they can be either qualified as equity or debt-holders. Anyway, besides the 
22 
 
differences intrinsic to the type of instruments, they are granted certain rights directly linked 
and attached to the securities in which they decide to invest. Rights attached to securities 
become crucial when there is possibility for agency problems to arise: these rights give investors 
the power to extract from managers, or from controlling shareholders, the return on their 
investment (LLSV, 1998). Rights provided to minorities represent a guarantee and a 
reassurance mechanism of the satisfaction of their objective function. Without those rights and 
related reassurance, they would probably decide not to invest their financial resources. The 
lacked investment decision would make more and more difficult the raise of external finance 
for firms, thus creating potential issues for what concerns their growth and development. For 
these reasons, investors are crucial company stakeholders, whose interests need to be satisfied 
and protected. Indeed, nowadays they are the main beneficiaries of regulative efforts concerning 
various aspects of companies, especially listed ones. According to some authors, it is possible 
to say that all reforms and legal frameworks implemented in listed companies have the direct 
or indirect purpose of protecting minorities (Campobasso, 2014).  For instance, investors are 
conceived as the primary addresses of financial statements disclosures, since they need to be 
constantly updated and aware of company activities and performance, in order to take effective 
investment decisions. By constantly providing investors relevant and high-quality information, 
and by granting them additional rights which ensure their safeguard from potential 
expropriation and damage of their investments, investor level of confidence is enhanced. 
 
Furthermore, considering a broader perspective, investors and their related investment decision 
are not only able to influence listed companies’ development, but, rather, the economic system 
at large. Investor reassurance and willingness to provide financial resources is a necessary 
condition to make financial markets expand. Indeed, most researches in the economic literature 
affirm that the degree of legal protection of investors within a country is a crucial aspect able 
to determine the development of its financial market (LLSV, 2002). In what ways a better 
protection of investors could be able to enhance financial market development?  
 
La porta et al. (2002) state that when investors are better protected, they are more willing to 
invest their financial resources. They might be disposed at paying more for financial assets in 
which they want to invest. Why paying more? Because they recognize that with stronger legal 
protections, is more likely that they will receive the return for the investment made, in the form 
of either interest or dividend, by, at the same time reducing the possibility of being expropriated 
by the dominant shareholders. Hence, legal protection of investor increases prices of securities 
traded in the market. But, by limiting expropriation and enhancing confidence, there are much 
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more investors willing to finance firms. This in turn make financial markets enhanced, since 
they are made able to grow both in terms of size and value.  
According to this view, corporate governance is intended as the set of mechanisms and rules 
able to ensure that the suppliers of finance to corporations will get a return on their investment 
(Love 2010). In other words, it becomes a guarantee and reassurance instrument able to secure 
investments and their optimal compensation. Well-functioning and protective systems for 
minorities are deemed crucial, since the feeling of reassurance they create make companies 
more attractive, thus encouraging the overall investments in financial markets. Hence, 
protecting minorities means protecting and enhancing the financial market itself (Campobasso, 
2014).   
 
1.5 The board of directors: a way of mitigating agency costs 
As previously underlined, the major objective of corporate governance is minimizing agency 
problems and related costs. In order to achieve this fundamental goal, companies make use of 
several governance mechanisms. Particularly, governance structures and more generally good 
corporate governance practices, by reducing agency costs, are able to effectively improve firm 
value and operating performance (Renders and Garemynck, 2012). 
 
Among internal governance structures, the board of directors is deemed as a crucial element 
able to determine the success of a company operations and performance. It can be defined as a 
collective body, made up of different members, generally identified as company directors. 
These are appointed by shareholders during the general assembly, with the main aim of 
representing their interest. Governing boards are conceived as the most important governance 
structure of the company and are indeed present in a wide variety of organizations all over the 
world. Given their spread and relevance across organization, it is also straightforward to ask 
why they exist. An immediate answer to this question views boards as a direct product of 
regulation: corporate laws require for listed companies the creation of a collective body which 
is empowered of the governing function of the corporation.  Anyway, considering board 
existence only as a compliance mechanism with regulation does not provide a clear and 
complete picture. An additional hypothesis views boards as a “market solution to an 
organizational design problem”: the agency problem (Hermalin and Weisback, 2001).  
 
According to Monks and Minow (2004) boards represent the link between the providers of risk 
capital and people who make use of the capital provided to create value. Thus, the board of 
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directors might be considered as a liaison between shareholders and management (Aluchna, 
2010). Representing such link, it is possible to say that the board major role is to align 
management and shareholder interests, in order to reduce possible agency costs and ensure good 
firm performance. According to this view, the board represents a fundamental endogenously 
created institution able to mitigate agency problems characterizing all organizations (Hermalin 
and Weisback 2001). Anyway, how board of directors can be considered an effective solution 
to agency problems within organizations? 
 
As previously described, agency costs and problems arise from the separation of ownership and 
control, particularly from the assumption that the owners delegate substantial executive and 
operating powers to managers. However, given shareholders impossibility to oversee 
management activities, they need to be reassured that the powers they provide will not be 
abused at their costs (Aluchna, 2010). Hence, the necessity of creating a monitoring and control 
body within the company, which should represent and ensure the satisfaction of shareholders’ 
interests. By controlling management activities and performances, the board is able to mitigate 
and prevent possible agency costs to arise: if the monitoring activity is effective, managers are 
not able to seek only their personal interests, thus they will act pursuing the interest of the whole 
company, indeed the one of shareholders. Anyway, it is also necessary to consider that too strict 
and restrictive controls on management activities might have negative effects on performance, 
and consequently on shareholder value. Thus, the need for the board, not only of representing 
shareholders and control managers, but rather of “balancing two distinct powers: the power of 
those who own the corporation and the power of those who run it” (Monks and Minow 1996, 
as cited by Aluchna 2010).  
 
Boards of directors are also deemed crucial in mitigating agency costs arising from conflict of 
interests between different types of shareholders. Corporate governance best practices and 
regulations suggest and require having boards mainly composed by independent directors, 
generally defined as outside members. These are defined as “non-management members of the 
board”, hence representing all board members different from executives, company 
stakeholders and employees (Johnson et al., 1996). Indeed, board composition has evolved 
dramatically during the last few decades:  in 2018 the 83% of directors of S&P 1500 companies 
qualify as independent, a huge increase if compared with the almost 60% accounted in 2000 
(EY Center for board matters, 2018). Given the absence of any direct or indirect material 
relation with the company, its management and shareholders, they are defined as impartial, 
hence viewed as a fundamental mechanism able to prevent and avoid opportunistic behaviours 
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which can damage the whole company as well as minorities (Uribe-Bohorquez et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, it is frequent that outside directors are mainly representative of minority 
shareholders, indeed investors. When minorities are represented within boards they are more 
powerful and more active in protecting their interests, limiting potential issues related to private 
benefits of control and minority expropriation. Hence, allowing minority shareholders to have 
representatives within the board is a fundamental mechanism able to mitigate the principal-
principal conflict and related agency costs (Moscariello et al., 2018). In these terms the board 
is not only viewed as a liaison between shareholders and management, but also as “a platform 
for balancing shareholders and stakeholders’ expectations, for discussing corporate strategy, 
for resolving shareholder conflicts and fights” (Aluchna, 2010).  
 
Although the primary functions of monitoring management and balancing conflicting interests 
of shareholders, boards serves additional roles as well. The board of directors is generally 
identified as the governing body of corporations, often defined as the “ultimate legal authority 
with respect to decision making in the firm” (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). It is empowered with 
general administration functions, which should be pursued with the main objective of long-term 
value creation for company shareholders (Borsa Italiana, Corporate Governance Code, 
principle 1.1 and 1.2.). The governance literature tends to classify directors’ responsibilities 
into three crucial roles: control, service and resource dependence. The control role entails 
monitoring management, the service role involves the advisory of top managers, while the last 
one regards the acquisition of resources which are deemed critical to the firm growth and 
success (Johnson et al., 1996).  
 
However, discussing board roles and responsibilities also involves mentioning and describing 
different kind of board structures. These, together with board procedures might vary both within 
and among countries. The most adopted board structures are represented by the one-tier system 
and the two-tier system. The former, more diffused in Anglo-Saxon countries, is composed by 
a unitary body, the board, which performs several activities. The latter, more diffused in 
continental Europe, is based on two main bodies: the management and supervisory board, which 
are empowered with distinct roles and functions. Other counties, like Italy and France, adopt 
other governance systems characterized by the presence of the board of directors and of an 
additional statutory body which mainly perform audit functions.  
According to Aluchna (2010) unitary boards have been proved to be flexible and efficient given 
the direct contact between executives and non-executives members. Their main negative aspect 
relies in the powerful positions of CEO, who generally holds also the Chairman functions. In 
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these specific circumstances there is a clear control of the board’ work and policy by the top 
management, thus the potential lack of objectivity in the company administration. On the other 
hand, dual boards, because of the clear separation of the two main functions, provide higher 
objectivity and independence, particularly in the process of management control, evaluation 
and compensation. However, this kind of system is often criticized for being more expensive 
and for determining the lack of direct contact and information sharing between members of the 
two separated bodies (Aluchna, 2010).  
 
Without going into details of the specific activities performed, the general and essential role of 
boards is governing the corporation, with the sole purpose of creating and adding value to 
shareholders and other company stakeholders (Carver, 2007). It is fundamental to underline 
that the governance role should not be confused with the management one. The major board of 
director responsibility is to “direct the company”, by defining and establishing the overall 
direction and strategy of the business. Instead, it is management function and responsibility to 
effectively “operate the company” and run the business on a day by day basis, according to the 
correct implementation of the previously defined strategy.  
Even though board and management roles and activities are different, it is possible to identify 
a strong relation between them. This link is represented from one side by the oversight function 
exercised by the board of directors on managers; from the other side, boards are said to be 
“resource providers” to managers. The idea of the resource provision role of the board was 
proposed for the first time by Pfeffer (1972), within the context of the resource dependence 
theory. According to his view, boards serve as valuable links between the company internal and 
external environment (Hambrick et al., 2015). Thanks to directors’ expertise, ties and 
relationships, they can easily access external information, thus providing the company 
management and executives with relevant insights from several perspectives. These arguments, 
which point out the relevance of directors as resource providers, underline another crucial 
function performed by boards: the advisory role of top managers.  
 
Given the crucial functions performed by the board of directors, and particularly its major role 
in mitigating the general agency issues, the next chapter will provide a more detailed analysis 
of this fundamental governance structure, with particular reference to its composition and the 






Chapter 2: Board of directors: minority representation 
 
2.1 Board composition  
Board composition, intended as a mixture of various fundamental elements, such as 
independence, size, skills and diversity, appears crucial for an adequate governance and 
administration of the company. The continuously changing regulation has pressured companies 
to put under examination their board composition. This trend was mainly based on the crucial 
idea that there is a causal relation between board composition and company economic and 
financial performance (Martin and Herrero, 2018, Mclntyre et al., 2007). Hence, given the 
relevance of board structures in assisting corporations in the value creation process, it becomes 
fundamental for companies to have well managed and well-structured boards.  
 
Given that boards are identified as collective bodies made of different members, the first 
fundamental attribute related to board composition refers to its size, defined as the total number 
of directors that should be appointed in the board. According to the OECD Corporate 
Governance Factbook 2019, not all jurisdictions provide specific legal requirements concerning 
optimal board size: about the 82% of countries analysed recommend a minimum number of 
board members between 3 or 5. On the other hand, limits on the maximum size for boards are 
rare: only ten jurisdictions (out of forty-nine analysed) set a maximum board size, in most cases 
between 15 to 21 members. Indeed, generally, corporate laws provide companies with ample 
autonomy in defining the most appropriate size of their boards, according to their specific 
characteristics and needs. Thus, the definition of board size is generally contained in each 
company bylaws and might be different among companies and across countries.  
 
Generally, in literature board size if often related to business complexity. According to Lehn et 
al (2009) there exist a positive relation between business complexity and board size: very 
complex and structured businesses are associated with larger boards, since they work with more 
information, face more issues and have a higher need of advice. Anyway, results in this field 
are not unanimous, since other authors as Donnelly and Kelly (2005) observe exactly the 
opposite relation. The main explanation of this inverted relation could be that, even if larger 
boards are associated with more knowledge and a better capacity of analysis and advice, they 
also make more difficult to reach agreements, thus creating more difficulties in the decision-
making process. According to this view, complex business should be rather associated with 
28 
 
smaller boards which are able take decisions and act in a more efficient way (Martin and 
Herrero, 2018). 
 
The UK Board Index Report, released by Spencer Stuart, provides evidence about the average 
board size across the main European countries and USA. This research, which consider board 
data at the end of April 2018, shows that the average board size across countries range from a 
minimum of 8 to a maximum value of 13.8 members. Countries like Poland, Norway and 
Finland appears to have smaller board on average, while Germany and France the larger.  
 
Figure 2.1: Average board size by country 
 
Source: author’s elaboration from UK Spencer Stuart Board Index 2018 
 
As previously underlined, the existing empirical evidence provides mixed results about board 
size. In fact, besides the growing body of literature and empirical researches, there is still no 
clear definition of optimal board size: the only point of agreement for several studies is that the 
optimal board size is a direct function of firm’s specific characteristics (Raheja, 2005). Indeed, 
each company will determine the size of its board of directors considering the country and the 
industry in which it operates, as well as considering its intrinsic specificities and characteristics.  
 
Board composition is also frequently related to board tenure, generally defined in terms of years 
and representing the period in which the board exercise its duties and required functions, before 
re-election. According to the OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2019, the maximum term 
of office before re-election of the board varies from one to six years. However, considering a 
three-year period as maximum board tenure is the most common practice among countries: 
indeed, requested by rules and codes of the 29% of the analysed jurisdictions. At the same time, 


















twelve jurisdictions, corresponding to the 25% of the sample, do not establish a maximum 
length for board tenure.  
 
Figure 2.2: Maximum term of board office 
 
Source: author’s elaboration from OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2019 
 
Anyway, besides the specific measures, in most countries the re-election of some or all directors 
is allowed for an unlimited period of times. In other words, many countries, including Italy do 
not have specific term limits on director service. Directors tenure has become a topic of interest 
in the last decades, especially considering the impact that board tenure might have on board 
effectiveness. In these terms, tenure is often considered as an additional determinant of director 
quality (Vafeas, 2003). However, there is a still unsolved debate regarding the effect of whether 
long-term or short-term tenures might be considered optimal in terms of board performance. 
Vafeas (2003) propose two distinct hypothesis regarding tenure: on one hand, the expertise 
hypothesis suggests that long servicing directors are associated with more knowledge, 
competence and experience regarding company activities and operating environment; on the 
other, the management friendliness hypothesis suggests that seasoned directors might be 
entrenched and more affiliated with company managers, hence less likely to control their 
activities.  
 
The fundamental issue related to long-tenure boards is linked to directors’ independence. 
Within this context, the major concern is that outside directors that join the board for prolonged 
periods of times might lose their external and super partes viewpoint in monitoring company 
activities and operations. Thus, board tenure exactly “captures the trade-off between knowledge 
accumulation and board independence” (Huang and Hilary, 2018). Indeed, short-tenure boards 
create the inverse problem: short-tenure directors can be easily considered independent, but at 
the same time, they lack a complete understanding and experience in terms of company 

















kinds of directors’ tenure might be detrimental for board and firm performance: long tenure 
directors might be inefficient in controlling management, while short tenure directors might be 
inefficient in performing their role, given their lack of company expertise.  
 
Even though, the debate is still unsolved, empirical researches provide evidence that the 
presence of directors with many years of service on the board (twenty or even more) signal 
CEO entrenchment, thus suggesting that extreme lengths of board tenure are detrimental to 
shareholder interests (Vafeas, 2003). Other studies, analysing the relation between board tenure 
and firm value, find an inverted U-shaped relation between the two variables. More specifically, 
firm value reaches its peak around a board tenure of approximately 10 years, then as the length 
of time increases, a reduction of firm value is recorded. Indeed, the optimal tenure is identified 
in a range between 8 and 11 years (Huang and Hilary, 2018). Given the significant effect of 
tenure on firm performance and value, a growing number of countries have adopted in their 
codes and regulations some requirements related to the maximum length of board tenure: 
generally ranging between 9 and 12 years. 
 
As size and tenure are mainly referred to the overall structure of the board, there are other 
fundamental attributes of board composition more directly related to board members: 
independence, skills and diversity. These are deemed fundamental qualities of directors able to 
significantly influence board effectiveness and consequently company economic and financial 
performance. Given their relevance in terms of board composition as well as of directors’ 
individual features, they deserve a more detailed and specific analysis, hence presented in the 
subsequent paragraphs.  
 
2.1.2 Board Independence  
Independence represents another key attribute in terms of board composition. It can be defined 
as the absence of any direct or indirect relation between directors and the company. In fact, a 
director who qualify as independent should not have any “substantive relationship with the firm 
as employee or in any other capacity beyond his role on the board” (Neville et al., 2019).  
Given their independence from the company, they are frequently defined as outside directors 
and are generally classified as all “non-management members of the board”. In the opposite 
view, inside directors, are the ones which for their roles or specific characteristics do not qualify 
as independent. In literature, insiders are defined as “directors also serving as firm officers”, 
indeed company executive members (Johnson et al., 1996).  
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The idea of independence is closely linked to the agency theory: as the board primary role is to 
mitigate potential issues and costs arising from the two types of agency problems, it is highly 
recommended that directors are independent from both shareholders and top managers. In fact, 
independence is also frequently defined as the directors’ “ability to be objective” (Hambrick et 
al., 2015). Directors’ objectivity is necessary to control management decisions and policies, as 
well as to limit minority expropriation actions. In these terms, independent directors are viewed 
as a possible solution to the issue of providing and ensuring effective monitoring. But, what 
effective monitoring means?  
 
Basically, that directors perform their role adequately: they control management and they ask 
questions, challenge and dissent from management initiatives, if those initiatives could 
potentially damage company or shareholders’ interests. Without independent directors, it is 
more likely that personal ties and relationships of directors with the company reduce effective 
monitoring, thus enhancing the potential for opportunistic behaviours of CEOs and controlling 
shareholders and consequently governance failures (Hambrick et al., 2015).  
According to a slightly broader perspective, the rise of independent directors is not only driven 
by the need to mitigate agency problems, but it is rather associated with major shift in the 
political and economic environment. In a political economy characterized by the maximization 
of shareholder value as major corporate objective and by the greater informativeness of stock 
market prices, independent directors are deemed crucial (Gordon, 2007). With the shift toward 
shareholder wealth maximization, the role of the board has more and more shifted from 
management advice to management monitoring, with a significant emphasis on controlling the 
clarity and integrity of company financial disclosure. Furthermore, as stock prices become more 
informative, insiders lose their privilege of having access to fundamental information, thus 
becoming less valuable. Within this context, given the relevance of monitoring activities and 
the easier access to information, board composition automatically shifted in favour of 
independent directors. 
 
According to Gordon (2007) the rise of independent directors has been quite evident in the last 
decades: by looking at board composition of US public listed firms in the period 1950-2005, it 
is possible to notice a sharp shift in board composition from insiders toward independent 
directors. Specifically, independent members, representing approximately 20% of the board in 
1950, became almost 75% in 2005. The increasing trend has steadily developed in the first 
decades of the analysed period, then it sharply accelerates from 1970 onwards. According to 
Gordon (2007), the main explanation of this feature can be found in the huge development of 
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mechanisms and regulations aiming at creating director independence. The most relevant 
regulatory effort was made in the 1970s, with an overall corporate governance reform which 
introduced for the first time in the governance lexicon the term independent director. Where, 
at that time, it represented the kind of director “capable of fulfilling the monitoring role” 
(Gordon, 2007). During the years, especially in the wave of major corporate scandals and 
governance failures, there have been major efforts to enhance director independence and board 
composition standards. This trend has interested not only US, but also many other jurisdictions. 
Indeed, nowadays Codes and Principles of Corporate Governance as well as Stock Market 
Regulations recommend and require the great majority of board members of public corporation 
to be independent, where independence is assessed through established independence criteria.  
 
According to the OECD Governance Factbook 2019, almost all jurisdictions have introduced 
requirements or recommendation regarding the need to have a minimum number or ratio of 
independent directors inside boards.  
 
Figure 2.3: Independence requirements and recommendation 
 
Source: author’s elaboration from OECD Governance Factbook 2019 
 
As depicted in the pie chart above, the great majority of jurisdictions, accounting for the 96% 
of the total, has established independence requirements and recommendations. While, the 
remaining 4%, including only two countries (Luxembourg and Slovak Republic), does not 
require nor recommend director to be independent. More specifically, 51% of jurisdictions ask 
for the independence of at least 50% of the board. The remaining 45% of countries have 
established a minimum independence requirement for at least two or three board members, 
generally correspondent to a minimum ratio between 20- 30% of the board.  
 
Consistently with the data provided by Gordon (2007), the shift towards more independent 









of independent directors by country, it is possible to see that it ranges between the lowest 
amount of 38% (Russia) to a maximum amount equal to 87.1% (Netherlands); with eleven 
countries, out of fourteen which have a portion of independent directors above the 50% 
threshold. Indeed, it seems evident that besides the country specific requirements and 
recommendations, directors which qualify as independent are the great majority of non-
executive directors. 
 
Figure 2.4: Percentage of independent directors by country 
 
Source: author’s elaboration from UK Spencer Stuart Board Index 2018 
 
Board independence is indeed a crucial aspect of board composition, particularly and directly 
related to the concept of board effectiveness: it has been empirically proved that board and firm 
performance are significantly influenced by the activities of independent directors (Johnson et 
al., 1996). Even though, the most immediate and straightforward way to enhance board 
independence is to appoint board members which qualify as such, there are several other 
mechanisms and structures able to reach the same fundamental objective. For instance, 
according to Gordon (2007), board members independence can be improved by providing them 
with both negative and positive incentives: typical sanctions and reward schemes. From the 
economic perspective, the most applied sanction is represented by the monetary exposure 
directors face in cases of breaches of their duties; while the more diffused reward mechanism 
is essentially given by a significant compensation. Besides the monetary and economic aspect, 
also reputation appears fundamental to enhance director independence. Typically, directors do 
not want to be associated with governance scandals or poorly performing firms, since these 
negative facts regarding companies they govern will affect their personal reputation, as well as 
the possibilities of future directorships in other companies. In order to preserve their personal 









functions. Furthermore, another way to improve director independence is the creation and use 
of intra-board structures: the lead independent director. Best practices, in specific cases, suggest 
designating a lead independent director: an independent figure who join the board in the case 
in which there is coincidence between the board chairman and the company chief executive 
officer, or if the chairman is the company major owner. In these circumstances the lead 
independent director is conceived as a “focal point” able to manage board activities in an 
effective and objective manner, thus ensuring board independence in situations in which it is 
highly probable it could be undermined. Another fundamental mechanism able to enhance 
independence is the reduction of management influence in the matter of directors’ selection, 
appointment and retention. In fact, directors appointed by executives might feel a strong sense 
of fidelity, loyalty and gratitude in their regards, thus, potentially compromising directors’ 
ability to be objective in performing their activities and major tasks. Indeed, by reducing 
executive influence over the director appointment process, it is also possible to some extent to 
increase board independence.  
 
Having underlined the relevance of the concept of independence, it also appears necessary to 
define what independence constitutes, and what are the criteria used to qualify a director as 
independent. According to the OECD, typical criteria for which a director cannot qualify as 
independent include:  
1. familiar ties with the management or shareholder of the company; 
2. employment relation with the company, or with a company belonging to the same group; 
3. receipt of any kind of compensation from the company, different from directorship fees; 
4. material business relations with the company or its group; 
5. crossing the maximum tenure as a board member; 
6. being or representing a significant company shareholder; 
(OECD Corporate Governance Factbook, 2019).  
 
Besides the commonalities which can be identified, the definition of independence as well as 
the regulatory approach vary significantly across countries. Large variations particularly refer 
to independence from a significant shareholder and the setting of a maximum level of board 
tenure (respectively points 1 and 5). Concerning the former, 80% of jurisdictions consider as 
main independence requirement the absence of any kind of relation with respect to substantial 
shareholders, where the shareholding threshold ranges from 2% to 50%, with 10- 15% range as 
the most common.  For the latter, slightly more than the half of jurisdictions (26 out of 49) set 
as independence requirement a certain level of maximum tenure, generally varying from 5 to 
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15 years, with the mode ranging between 8-10 years. Once the crossing of maximum tenure 
occurs, for the great majority of countries (19 jurisdictions) the director cannot qualify and be 
appointed as independent director anymore, for some other (the remaining 7 jurisdictions) an 
explanation of the reason why the director still qualifies as independent is required.  
 
2.1.3 Board skills 
Another fundamental part of the corporate governance debate resolves around the composition 
of corporate boards in terms of director skills and knowledge. The relevance of this topic is 
based on the common idea that firm performance is mainly driven and affected by its human 
capital resources, more specifically by the pool of hard and soft skills they own and provide the 
company with. As a direct consequence, board effectiveness appears to be directly linked to 
directors’ capabilities and acquired knowledge. If directors are skilled, they will more likely 
perform in the appropriate way their functions, by ensuring board effectiveness and positive 
performance.  
 
Indeed, skills appear fundamental determinants in the appointment of directors in the board and 
it is more and more frequent that companies are asked to provide insight into directors’ qualities 
and major characteristics. In fact, from 2009 the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) requires US public firms to disclose for each director “the specific experience, 
qualifications, attributes or skills that led to the conclusion that the person should serve as a 
director” (US SEC Regulation, as cited by Adams, 2018). Also, according to OECD 
Governance Principles, companies should disclose “information about board members, 
including their qualifications” (OECD, G20/2015, Principle V.A.5). Hence, it is common for 
listed companies to provide general information regarding directors on their websites as well 
as in governance documents and relations. The rationale behind these requirements is clear 
especially for public companies: given that most of their financial resources comes from 
investors, they need to provide them with relevant information, in order to ensure transparency 
and accountability of company main decisions and actions.  
 
Moreover, given the crucial role they perform, company directors and top managers, are 
generally defined as highly skilled job profiles: in order to run, direct and monitor company 
activities they need certain levels of skills and capabilities. When dealing with skills, we mean 
personal attributes which can be declined in actual knowledge, practical abilities or also way of 
being and to relate with others. Not always skills, like leaderships or emotional intelligence, 
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can be directly observable and easily measured. That is why most empirical researches have 
focused on observable measures of skills such as the level of education.  
 
According to Gottesman and Morey (2006), educational qualifications owned, both in terms of 
typology and number, might be considered as good proxies for directors and managers skills 
and intelligence.  On the other hand, skills cannot only be explained, and thus measured, by 
education. In fact, it is not unusual that high performing firms have not highly educated 
founders, managers or representatives (Darmadi, 2011).  Particularly, educational background 
of CEO has been found to be unrelated with firm financial performance: besides the typology 
of studies attended, the level of education achieved, firms with better educated CEO and 
directors do not perform differently from others (Gottesman and Morey, 2010). There could be 
several explanations to this fundamental empirical finding, the most important is that education 
is basically only one part of the picture in explaining general skills of directors and managers. 
According to Gottesman and Morey (2010) view, the length of time between university studies 
and the achievement of the director or executive office is sufficiently high to diminish any kind 
of benefit that can be obtained by a certain level of education. Thus, in many cases educational 
background is not able to explain CEO’s and directors’ current performance, which instead is 
directly linked to their set of general skills, competences and knowledge (also including 
education) developed over their entire life. Hence, education is fundamental, but it only 
represents a tiny fraction of the complex set of skills individuals own.  
Hence, personal skills of directors need to be taken into consideration. Within this context, it is 
straightforward to ask: which are the most relevant skills directors should possess in order to 
better perform their roles and to create value for the company? 
 
Because of the arising of global financial crisis and of the main accounting scandals, nowadays, 
financial and accounting skills are deemed necessary for board effectiveness. The implicit 
assumption is that the general understanding of financial statements and accounting principles 
is needed by the board to better perform its oversight and monitoring function, thus satisfying 
shareholders’ interests (Guner et al., 2008). Moreover, in the wave of globalization, another 
skill deemed important in boards is the international expertise. Indeed, foreign directors might 
be a valuable resource, especially for companies with significant foreign operations, or which 
are planning an international geographical expansion of their business (Masulis et al., 2011).  
At the same time, also industry expertise appears to be a fundamental director qualification. 
Indeed, a survey of directors, conducted in 2012 by PricewaterhouseCoopers, identify prior 
industry experience as the most desired qualification in director nominees (Faleye et al., 2017). 
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Industry expert directors have a clear understanding of company business and of the related 
economic environment. In addition, given their knowledge and the possibility to establish 
connections with key industry players, they might have access to relevant information for the 
firm. Particularly, industry expertise is deemed crucial to reduce information asymmetry 
between directors and executive, since it provides a better knowledge of the risks and 
opportunities that the company might respectively face or join. This expertise translates in better 
oversight of management choices, as well as in an increase ability of directors to advise 
management in the identification and evaluation of value creating opportunities (Faleye et al., 
2017). 
 
However, the individual analysis of directors’ skills, particularly of whether one single ability 
can or cannot add value, has leaded to conflicting results in the economic literature. The main 
explanation is that what really matters in the value creation process, is not the ability of the 
single director, but rather how directors’ skills are represented and combined at board level. 
Directors, exactly like boards, are not one-dimensional and their skills are interdependent 
(Adams et al, 2018). Indeed, besides the relevance of each specific skill, each director has 
multiple skills and characteristics which are bundled, and only in relation to other board 
member skills, they can jointly affect company performance.   
 
2.1.4 Board diversity 
The topic of diversity is another significant factor according to which board composition can 
be valued and defined. Diversity has become a focal point to be managed in all kind of 
organizations, since they operate in a continuously evolving, multicultural and multinational 
environment. Indeed, researches dealing with diversity in organizations have developed 
conspicuously. Results of researches conducted pointed out that diversity is at the same time a 
great opportunity, as well as an enormous challenge for organizations (Milliken and Martins, 
1996). There are indeed two general conflicting opinions regarding the relation between 
diversity and group performance. On one hand, some research suggest that diversity enhance 
group knowledge, innovation and creativity, thus determining a high-quality decision-making 
process. According to this view, diversity appears to be a significant competitive advantage, 
able to positively effect performance. On the other hand, some authors argue that diversity 
might lead group members to disagree, thus weakening the team consensus and the overall 
efficiency of the decision-making process. In these terms, it might clearly represent a 
disadvantage in terms of positive and efficient group performance (Erhardt et al, 2003).  
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Hence, the idea of diversity as an opportunity is linked to the several perspectives, opinions and 
contributions brought by very diverse groups. However, the great diversity might create 
coordination and communication difficulties, thus representing a fundamental challenge to 
address. Besides the growing body of researches dealing with the topic, the debate regarding 
the potential effect of diversity on organizations performance is still open.  
 
Furthermore, it also appears fundamental to underline that, the concept of diversity within 
organizations is very broad. It deals both with directly observable attributes like race, 
nationality, age, gender, generally defined as “demographic diversity”; and with non-directly 
observable and measurable attributes such as education, skills and personal values, generally 
defined as “cognitive diversity”. In relation to boards, the prevailing economic literature has 
defined diversity as the percentage of women and other ethnicities in the board (Carter et al., 
2003). Within this context board diversity directly translates into gender and ethnicity diversity, 
indented as the fair and equal representation of different genders as well as different racial and 
cultural backgrounds. According to this view, diverse directors are basically representative of 
traditional minorities: women and minorities ethnicities. Indeed, they are defined as 
“individuals with unique characteristics that create additional value for shareholders” (Carter 
et al., 2007). Thus, the crucial point attached to diversity in the boardroom is that diversity is 
assumed to enhance effectiveness of board actions, which in turn leads to an increased firm 
profitability and to a higher shareholder value. But how board performance and effectiveness 
can be enhanced by diverse directors?  
 
One argument suggests that diverse board increase board independence, because directors with 
different gender, ethnicity and cultural background could more actively challenge management 
decision, thus providing better management monitoring and control (Carter et al., 2003). For 
instance, it has been empirically proven that female directors have higher attendance records 
and are more likely to take part to audit committees, with respect to male directors (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009). Furthermore, women and minority directors bring unique information, insight 
and knowledge which improves communication on topics and issues that might be otherwise 
not taken into consideration, thus providing the board with innovative approaches able to 
mitigate stagnant and redundant thinking (Carter et al., 2007). By bringing additional 
information, broader perspectives and skills they ensure effective advisory to management 
teams. Indeed, companies should promote diversity within their boards, where board diversity 
should be viewed as inclusion of different individuals, views, knowledge and experiences that 
allow boards to perform in the most efficient way. 
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Given the potential positive effects of board diversity on shareholder value and firm 
performance, there have been many corporate governance initiatives and reform recommending 
increasing board diversity. For what concerns gender diversity, nowadays a growing number of 
jurisdictions is adopting measures and regulations whose main purpose is to increase women’s 
participation and representation in corporate boards. The Governance Principles issued by the 
OECD suggest several measures to enhance gender diversity: disclosure requirements, 
boardroom mandatory quotas or voluntary targets, or even private initiatives (Principle VI.E.4). 
Among the 49 jurisdictions analysed in the OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2019, 
disclosure requirements regarding gender composition of boards are requested by laws and 
stock exchange regulations of 24 countries, accounting to the 49% of the total. At the same 
time, such disclosure is recommended by Corporate Governance Codes of other three 
jurisdictions.  
 
For what concerns provisions to achieve gender diversity on boards, the 38,78% of countries 
do not apply specific requirements, while the remaining 61,22% of the surveyed countries have 
adopted such provisions in the form of quotas or targets.  
 
Figure 2.5: Requirements to enhance gender diversity on boards 
 
Source: author’s elaboration from OECD Governance Factbook 2019 
 
Quotas, which are mandatory requirements setting a minimum number or percentage of women 
in boards, have been applied by the 36,73% of jurisdictions (18 countries out of 49). While 
targets, defined as voluntary measurable objectives which need to be achieved in given 
timeframes, have been used by the 18, 37% of countries. Furthermore, three jurisdictions, 












Among the 21 jurisdictions establishing mandatory requirements in the form of quotas, the great 
majority require a female participation to the board ranging between 20% and 40%. At the same 
time three jurisdictions require companies to have “at least one” female director on their boards.  
It is also frequent that jurisdictions establish sanctions schemes in the case in which such 
mandatory quotas are not respected. For instance, since 2008 all Norwegian listed companies 
must comply with a gender quota equal to 40%, otherwise in cases of non-compliance they face 
dissolution (Adams and Ferreira, 2009).  
 
Regarding women’s participation in corporate leadership positions, according to data collected 
at the end of 2017, women make up a higher percentage of top management positions than of 
board members. Women represent at least one-third of management teams in 19 jurisdictions, 
while representing one-third of the board only in 5 countries. However, the average portion of 
women directors in the boards has increased steadily: analysing the boards of directors of S&P 
1500 firms, the number of female directors has been doubling from 7% in 1998 to 14% in 2013 
(Kim and Starks, 2016). The increasing trend has been consistent also by looking at the S&P 
500 firms, for which in 2018, the 24% of all directors were women. According to the US 
Spencer Stuart Board Index, this figure represents a new record: indeed, it is the highest 
percentage of women directors seen since 1998, in fact, female directors accounted for the 22% 
in 2017, and 16% in 2008. Also, in European countries the percentage of female board members 
has increased during the last decades.  
 
Figure 2.6: Female representation on the board 
 










As clearly evident in the figure above, Norway presents the highest percentage of female board 
participation, equal to 45.6%. It is then followed by France and Sweden, accounting to 42.5% 
and 39.1% respectively. Other countries have a female representation ranging between 20% 
and 33%. More specifically, in UK the percentage of female directors has risen to 27.5%, with 
an increase of 2% from 2017 and of 3.1% from 2016. Among European countries, Russia 
represents the lowest women participation to the boardroom, only equal to 7.9%. 
 
Besides the increasing trend in board participation, women still hold few seats as executives 
and CEOs. Indeed, the presence of women in senior executive positions has increased over time 
since 2011 but at a lower rate with respect to non-executive positions. For instance, in 2018 the 
percentage of female non-executive directors in the UK FTSE 100 companies, was about 39%, 
while the percentage of female executives only accounted to approximately 18%, registering a 
slight decline of 4.3% from 2017. Only eight of the analysed companies had a female CEO. 
The lack of gender equality with respect to executive positions is not only an issue of UK, but 
it is rather widespread across Europe.   
 
Figure 2.7: Female executive directors  
 
Source: author’s elaboration from UK Spencer Stuart Board Index 2018 
 
Even in countries with the highest representation of women on boards there is still a significant 
imbalance in the female representation in executive committees. For instance, also countries 
like Norway and France (with a female board representation above 40%) reported a much lower 
percentage of female executive directors, equal to 24.4% and 16% respectively. Anyway, also 
for the other European countries the pattern in indeed similar: the percentage of female 
executive director range between a minimum of 10% to a maximum level of 24.7%, reported 







are about 10%, with only 27 of the analysed S&P 500 companies having one woman serving 
as CEO (US Spencer Stuart Board Index 2018).  
 
Concerning ethnicity diversity, as reported by the Spencer Stuart Board Index 2018, the 8% of 
the total board members of UK FTSE 150 companies were identified as a portion of black and 
minority ethnic (BME). The percentage of minority directors was sharply higher in US, where 
17% of directors in the top 200 S&P 500 companies are ethnic minorities: African-American 
(9%), Hispanic/Latino (4%) and Asian (4%). The overall percentage is quite consistent with the 
one of 2017, but significantly higher with respect to 2008, when it amounted to 14% of the total 
directors. Furthermore, the percentage of companies with at least one minority director has 
continued to increase during the last decades, from 84%in 2008 to 90.5% in 2018. In 2018, 16 
of the 200 analysed companies were held by ethnic minorities as CEOs, this figure has doubled 
considering the same data in 2013.  
 
Another element representing board diversity is the generational and age variety within boards. 
Generally, given the crucial role performed by directors, a certain level of experience and 
expertise is needed in order to be appointed as board members. Thus, it is highly infrequent to 
find boards with very young directors. The average age of directors, across different European 
countries and USA, is equal to 58.7 years. More specifically, it ranges from a minimum level 
of 54.3 for Russia, to a maximum amount of 63 years for United States (UK Spencer Stuart 
Board Index, 2018).  
 
2.3 Minority representation in the board of directors 
Minority protection is fundamental in order to ensure a correct and effective corporate 
governance within companies. Rights granted to minorities are deemed necessary both from an 
internal and external perspective: they relieve companies from costs related to secondary 
agency problems, and by limiting potential minority expropriation they enhance capital market 
functioning. Particularly, with respect to the always debated theme of minority protection, a 
crucial topic is represented by minority representation within fundamental governance 
structures of companies, especially in the board of directors. In fact, in order to better protect 
and satisfy minority interests, it is crucial for companies to foster minority shareholder 
participation in the process of board appointment, as well as representation within this 
fundamental structure.  
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From a slightly different perspective, allowing minority representation on boards could be 
conceived not only as a useful mechanism of minority protection, but also as a good practise to 
enhance board diversity. As previously stated, the topic of board diversity is extremely related 
to the concept of minorities, where for the latter we should intend all those individuals that for 
their specific characteristics are able to provide the board with unique information, insight and 
skills (Carter et al., 2007).  According to Carter et al., (2007), also minority directors might be 
considered “diverse directors” since they are able to provide the board with different 
perspectives and points of view, increasing communication on relevant issues not usually 
addressed.  
 
Given the relevance of minority representation mechanisms as measures to mitigate minority 
expropriation and enhance diversity across boards, it is fundamental to further investigate these 
systems and their implementation across jurisdictions. As reported by the OECD Corporate 
Governance Factbook 2019, some jurisdictions have introduced provisions and mechanisms 
able to allow and facilitate an effective participation and representation of minority 
shareholders. For instance, both Italy and Israel have established compulsory rules, that provide 
minority shareholders the possibility to appoint board members. More specifically, in Italian 
listed companies, at least one director must be appointed by minorities.  
 
In the United Kingdom, the Financial Conduct Authority requests premium listed companies to 
provide additional voting power to minority shareholders for what concern the election of 
independent directors. This mechanism, known as “dual voting”, is generally applied for 
companies in which a significant controlling shareholder is present. It basically requires 
independent directors to be approved separately by the entire group of company shareholders 
and by minority ones. Also, Spain, whose laws present similarities with the Italian ones, protect 
minority shareholder interests trying to ensure a proportional composition of the board. In 
Poland, shareholders, representative of at least one-fifth of the total ownership, can request the 
election of one director (Passador, 2018).   
 
Even the United States with the introduction of the “cumulative voting system” facilitate 
representation and participation of minorities within corporate governance structures. This is a 
voting procedure adopted for directors’ election, according to which:  
- each shareholder is entitled of an amount of votes equal to the number of owned shares 
multiplied by the number of directors to be elected; 
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- each shareholder can choose how to distribute his votes across the different candidates; 
(thus, deciding to attribute one vote to each candidate, distributing votes across 
candidates, or even to concentrate all votes on one potential director). 
This voting procedure is deemed to be beneficial to minorities, since they have the possibility 
to cumulate all their votes to one candidate, who might be entitled as their representative. 
Cumulative voting has been introduced for the first time in the USA, specifically in California 
in 1879. Besides the quite ancient introduction, according to a study conducted in 2006, the 
cumulative voting was explicitly forbidden in one US jurisdiction, compulsory only in six of 
the fifty American States, discretionary for the remaining forty-four (Alvaro et al., CONSOB 
2012). Nowadays, cumulative voting has spread also outside the American context: it is allowed 
by 45% of jurisdictions reviewed by the OECD Corporate Governance Factbook (2019); not 
allowed by the 41% of countries, and anyway required by regulations of only few jurisdictions, 
including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia and accounting for the 6% of the total.  
In addition to the cumulative voting system, another fundamental mechanism, developed in US 
and able to ensure the presence of minorities on the board, is the adoption of rules allowing for 
an easier access of shareholders to proxy systems. Indeed, according to the US Security 
Exchanges Act of 1934, minority shareholders are empowered to initiate an independent 
solicitation of proxies. More recently, on August 2010, the SEC has issued another fundamental 
provision: Rule 14a-11, according to which any individual shareholder or shareholder group, 
holding more than 3% of a public company’s shares for more than three consecutive years, can 
nominate one or more candidates to the board, up to the maximum limit of the 25% of board 
members. Surely important for minorities, the right can be exercised only if certain conditions 
are met: the shareholder or shareholder group continue to hold shares after the general 
shareholder meeting and did not acquire them only with the intention of changing company 
control or for achieving a higher number of representatives with respect to the ones allowed by 
the legislative framework (Alvaro et al., CONSOB 2012).  
 
In some other countries, minority shareholders are not only represented by investors, but also 
by employees. Indeed, some jurisdictions like Germany, Austria, Denmark and Sweden adopt 
rules able to strength employee position as well as the protection of their interests. An example 
is provided by the rule allowing employees, which own more than 3% of a company share 
capital, to appoint one or more directors (Passador, 2018).   
 
Besides the kind of minority, the attention to their protection and representation in the board is 
clearly and undoubtedly a crucial attribute shaping a good and sound corporate governance for 
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companies. Many jurisdictions allow companies to introduce and adopt in their bylaws, specific 
provisions with the aim of ensuring minority shareholders the possibility of proposing their own 
candidates to the board of directors. In the great majority of cases, this possibility is granted to 
minorities that own a certain minimal portion of company’s shares. At the same time, only few 
jurisdictions consider the representation of minorities within the board of directors as a 
fundamental and compulsory legal requirement. Hence, Italy represents one of these 
jurisdictions, providing a rare and interesting setting concerning minorities representation and 
their active participation within boards of directors. 
 
2.4 The Italian institutional setting  
The Italian context provides a unique setting due to the features of the directors’ election 
mechanism on the board, thus allowing minority shareholders to appoint their representatives 
within corporate governance major bodies. This mechanism is defined as “list voting” or even 
as “slate voting” and is regulated by Article 147-ter of the Italian “Testo Unico della Finanza” 
(from now onwards defined as TUF).  
 
It is generally defined as a charter provision (compulsory for listed companies) whose aim is 
allowing representation of minorities within the administrative and control bodies of 
companies. This type of provision is deemed fundamental, since it would introduce within 
companies “fundamental democracy principles”, by replacing the pure majority system with a 
more proportional one (Alvaro et al., CONSOB 2012).  
Indeed, the main purpose of the list voting system is to protect minorities and encourage their 
participation within the administrative structures of the company, in order to ensure a more 
balanced composition of the board. It was introduced in the Italian legal system more than a 
decade ago, and nowadays it is becoming increasingly relevant especially for institutional 
investors. The latter have indeed shown interest in the application of such legal arrangement, 
because it basically provides them the possibility to join the main governance structures and 
actively influence company operations and decisions, thus ensuring a more concrete satisfaction 
of their interests. For this reason, it has also been recognized as “an essential factor for 
shareholder activism” (Passador, 2018). 
 
The involvement of minorities in the administration function of companies is explained by the 
need of enforcing a higher protection of that specific group of shareholders, but also of 
safeguarding company interests. By appointing board members representatives of minority 
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groups, it is possible to mitigate the risk of running the business only in favour of controlling 
shareholders, rather than favouring the interests of the whole group of company owners.  
Based on this idea, the introduction of the list voting aimed at significantly improve corporate 
governance practices of Italian companies (Alvaro et al., CONSOB 2012).  
  
2.4.1 List voting: legal framework evolution  
The list voting legal arrangement was firstly introduced, even if not directly regulated, by the 
Italian Civil Code of 1942. According to the Code, board members are appointed by 
shareholders during the general shareholder meetings. Article 2368 of the Italian Civil Code 
states that decisions within the assembly are taken in accordance to the general majority rules, 
however, the second comma of the same article, affirms that “for the appointment of company 
officers, company bylaws might propose particular rules and procedures”.  
At that time, the Code did not present specific rules concerning board composition and minority 
representation within it. However, it was diffused opinion among many authors, that the ample 
autonomy attributed to companies charters in the process of officers’ appointment, should have 
been conceived as a first attempt to introduce the mechanism of list voting (Alvaro et al., 
CONSOB, 2012). It is worth underline that, in this case, list voting was not enforced by laws, 
but rather intended as a potential charter clause ensuring the company voluntary possibility of 
appointing board members representative of minority groups. However, besides the potential 
presence of such clauses in corporation charters, it was only in the 90s that list voting was 
explicitly disciplined by three fundamental regulative efforts.  
 
The first legal framework was provided by the law-decree n. 332/1994, then converted into law 
n. 474/ 1994, known as “Legge sulle privatizzazioni”. The specific rule, regarding list voting, 
was part of a more complex legal framework, whose main aim was to regulate the Government 
divestment of shares in corporations, which as a direct consequence became privatised.  
Article 4 of the cited special law has imposed to all privatised listed companies, which had 
introduced in their charters some limits to share ownership, the use of the list voting as voting 
system, allowing one fifth of board members to be appointed by minority lists. 
 
Then, with the legislative decree n.58/1998 the list voting previously determined only for 
privatised listed companies, was extended to all listed companies, thus, becoming for them a 
compulsory charter provision. However, at that moment, the voting mechanism was only 
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limited to the appointment of the supervisory board, the corporate body in charge of control and 
monitoring functions.   
 
It was only with a third legislative action, taken in 2005, that list voting was extended also to 
the appointment of directors, thus to the main corporate administrative body. Particularly, 
article 1 of the “Legge sul Risparmio” (law n. 262/2005), introduced the current definition of 
list voting as disciplined by article 147-ter of the Italian TUF. 
   
Even though, all the legislative efforts introduced concern the definition of the list voting 
mechanism, the purposes they pursued were indeed different. According to the explanation of 
list voting presented by the CONSOB (2012), with the first reform, the mechanism, potential 
and optional for all corporations, was made compulsory only for a specific class: privatised 
companies. Within this context, the legal tenet has identified the list voting as a temporary 
instrument able to guarantee a widely held ownership and a more equal distribution of power 
among shareholders. The final aim in this case was to increase the institutional investor interest 
in companies undergoing the process of privatization, thus stimulating their willingness to 
invest within such structures, with the final objective of accelerating the whole privatization 
process. Instead, with the subsequent legislative interventions, the introduction of list voting as 
a compulsory practice for all listed companies, can be explained as a reaction to major corporate 
and accounting scandals which pointed out the criticalities in corporate governance systems, as 
well as in minority protection rules. Hence, the main scope of such implementation was to 
explicitly introduce a legal framework able to enhance minority protection and increase their 
active participation within corporations (Alvaro et al., CONSOB, 2012). 
 
2.4.2 List voting: legal discipline 
Hence, nowadays, list voting is a compulsory charter provision for all Italian listed companies, 
and it is implemented for the appointment of both corporation boards requested by the Italian 
system of administration and control. It is currently disciplined by the article 147-ter of the 
Italian TUF.  
 
The first comma of the cited article, concerning the appointment and composition of the boards, 
states that: “board members are appointed on the basis of lists of candidates, presented by 
shareholders reaching a minimum threshold of ownership” (article 147-ter TUF).  
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In other words, each company shareholder, reaching a certain level of ownership has the right 
to present slates of candidates for the election of the board. Generally, company bylaws can 
autonomously determine the portion of ownership needed in order to exercise that right. In fact, 
the legislation only provides for a minimum limit equal to one-fourth of share capital, or to 
other percentages of ownership defined by the CONSOB for each issuer.  
Particularly, article 144-quarter of the CONSOB “Regolamento Emittenti” n. 11971, 
14/05/1998, states that: “besides the potential lower percentage requested by company bylaws, 
the portion of ownership requested to shareholders in order to present list of candidates for 
boards appointment ranges between 0.5% and 4.5% of the company share capital”. Such 
percentages are defined on the base of the issuer market capitalization and more specifically 
are equal to a share capital portion of: 
- 0.5% for companies whose market capitalization is higher than 15 billion; 
- 1% for companies whose market capitalization is between 1 and 15 billion; 
- 2.5% for companies whose market capitalization is lower or equal to 1 billion; 
- 4.5% for companies whose market capitalization is lower or equal to 375 million. 
Indeed, the general rule applied by the CONSOB requests shareholder a higher percentage of 
ownership, the lower the market capitalization of the issuer.  
 
In addition, article 147-ter request that, when presenting lists, shareholders need also to provide 
evidence of the minimum ownership required. Such evidence is determined with respect to 
shares owned at the date in which lists are submitted. Then, the ascertained ownership is 
certificated through an electronic communication provided by the financial intermediary, with 
which shares are deposited, to the company, at least 21 days before the general assembly.  
 
As for the evidence of share ownership, also slates need to be submitted within a specific term: 
at least 25 days before the date in which the general shareholder meeting is scheduled. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure transparency to investors and other company relevant 
stakeholders, it is also required that, 21 days before the general assembly, the lists together with 
candidates curriculum vitae are published on the corporation website.  
 
Indeed, the law and company charters require for specific terms in which lists need to be 
formed, submitted and published. The compliance with these terms is essential given that, list 
voting is implemented through “blocked lists”. In other words, once lists are submitted, they 
cannot be modified: hence candidates cannot be changed or substituted once the term for 
submission and publication has expired. The obligation of presenting lists before the general 
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assembly is deemed to influence positively board composition and election: it provides an 
increased transparency to shareholder and other stakeholders concerning board candidacies; 
and it allows to shape in advance the potential board composition (Richter Jr, 2007).  
 
The list voting implementation directly influence the voting methodologies: since lists are 
blocked, shareholders can only vote the lists of candidates as submitted. The crucial aspect 
concerning the voting mechanism for lists, rather than for single candidate, is that it allows to 
obtain a unique deliberation concerning the appointment of the entire board, and not related to 
its single components. The unique resolution is deemed fundamental because “only with the 
election of the entire board, or anyway of a plurality of candidates, it is possible to guarantee 
one or more seats to minority representatives” (Richter Jr, 2007).   
 
Indeed, the third comma of article 147-ter, explicitly requires that “at least one of the elected 
directors must be appointed from the list presented by the minority shareholder”. With this 
provision it is explicitly requested that, in the case in which more lists are submitted, a minimum 
number of members (generally one or two according to the board size) is taken from the 
minority slate. Furthermore, in order to ensure the possibility of election of minority board 
members, it is necessary that the corporation charters identify specific electoral rules: 
provisions which derogate the standard electoral systems based on pure majority rules, in favour 
of proportional systems of board election (Richter Jr, 2007).  
Companies bylaws generally provide for two rules of list voting implementation: the “majority” 
and “proportional” methods. The former is the one mostly used by companies and it requires 
that board members are elected from the list resulting first in terms of votes received, with a 
certain reservation of board seats for minorities. If more minority slates are presented, minority 
members are appointed from the one receiving the highest portion of votes.  
The latter is generally implemented within the finance industry and it requires that candidates 
are elected in proportion to votes received. Indeed, candidates in the slates are ordered in a 
progressive manner. Once votes for the lists have been collected, they are attributed to 
candidates by computing a certain ratio: number of votes received by the list divided by the 
order number of each candidate presented in the list. Then, the final appointed members are the 
candidates receiving the highest ratios. 
 
Another fundamental requirement demands that the list presented by minorities “should not be 
in any way connected, neither directly or indirectly, with shareholders, presenting or voting the 
list resulted first in terms of votes received” (article 147-ter, comma 3, TUF). The absence of 
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any kind of link between minority and majority lists is indeed fundamental in order to ensure 
the effectiveness of list voting in protecting minorities. In other words, the law wants to ensure 
that the candidates proposed by minorities lists are indeed representative of such minorities, 
and not linked with controlling shareholders. Anyway, the Italian legislator does not provide 
any specific definition of these “direct and indirect connections” between lists. Indeed, this 
delicate issue has been partially regulated by a recommendation issued by the CONSOB: 
communication DEM/9017893, 26/02/2009. The cited communication recommends, to 
shareholders presenting minorities lists for board election, to deposit also a declaration ensuring 
the absence of any connection with controlling or majority shareholders. Furthermore, it is also 
suggested to specify, within the declaration, the types of existent relations, if deemed relevant 
and significant. The same CONSOB Communication also provide a list of possible relations 
that could represent direct or indirect links between minorities and majority candidates: 
- the existence of family ties; 
- the past participation to shareholder agreements;   
- the existence of share ownerships, or reciprocal, direct and indirect, participations; 
- the assumption of offices in control and administration bodies of corporations belonging 
to controlling shareholders; 
- the existence of past or present commercial, financial and professional relations; 
- the taking part, either in a direct or indirect way, to the list of candidates presented by 
controlling shareholders.  
 
2.4.3 List voting: implementation in Italian listed companies    
According to Assonime and Emittenti titoli S.p.a. Report on corporate governance (2012), list 
voting was implemented by half of Italian listed companies in 2011. In fact, the submission of 
minorities lists ranges from 37% to 49% of the total, during the analysed period 2008-2011, 
anyway slightly increasing from 2008. In 2011, the percentage of minority lists presented has 
been equal to the 49% of the total slates for board of directors, while 47% for the board of 
statutory auditors.  
 
As depicted in the graph below, the actual possibility of presenting more lists of candidates 
appears more frequent in larger corporations. Minority slates for directors’ appointment have 
been submitted in the 67%; 50% and 41% of FTSE MIB, Mid cap and Small cap companies 
respectively. A similar trend can be identified also for the board of statutory auditors with 62%, 
53% and 37% respectively. In addition, no similar pattern is identifiable for boards across 
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industries: while minority lists for the appointment of directors are more frequent in non-
financial corporations, the opposite is true for the board of statutory auditors. At the same time, 
the presentation of minority slates is much more frequent in government held corporations: 
about 91% and 92% for directors and supervisors respectively.  On the other hand, it is 
significantly lower in family-controlled businesses: equal to 36% for board of directors and 
37% for board of statutory auditors.  
 
Figure 2.8: frequency (%) of minority lists presentation, by market segment, industry and  
       ownership 
 
Source: author’s elaboration from Governance Report, Assonime 2012 
 
Furthermore, by looking at the evolution of the number of minority directors and supervisors, 
it is evident that their number within boards has increased during the analysed period: indeed, 
increases of 8.28% for directors and of 30% for supervisors, have been registered from 2009 
till 2017. While the trend for supervisors appears quite stable, the one depicted for directors is 
more variable. In fact, a quite sharp decline occurred between 2013-2014, probably driven by 
































Figure 2.9: number of minority appointed directors and supervisors in the period 2009-2017  
 
Source: author’s elaboration from Governance Report, Assonime 2012 and subsequent years 
 
A similar increasing trend can be identified when analysing the number of companies 
presenting at least one minority appointed board member. It raised from almost 60 and 80 for 
directors and supervisors respectively, to slightly above 100 for both categories, thus testifying 
an enhanced minority representation on Italian boards.  
 
Figure 2.10: number of companies with minority appointed board members 
 
Source: author’s elaboration from Governance Report, Assonime 2012 and subsequent years 
 
2.4.4 List voting and minority directors: costs-benefits analysis 
Since its introduction and during the years after, the prevailing legal doctrine has both 
underlined potential benefits as well as criticalities of the list voting legal arrangement.  
Indeed, the major potential benefit that could arise from its implementation is surely to allow 
minorities representative to join and actively take part to the administration and control bodies 
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of corporations. Anyway, in addition to the major function of providing protection to minorities, 
the list voting also served as mechanism able to provide shareholder with a more equal 
representation, thus avoiding and reducing potential risks of management entrenchment, 
tunnelling or other private benefits of control. On the other hand, part of legal tenet has 
criticized this legal arrangement affirming that list voting might negatively influence company 
efficiency. This view was mainly driven by the idea that the involvement of minorities within 
boards would determine a potential contrast between minority and majority directors, thus 
creating a potential obstacle to the efficient and agile administration of the corporation (Alvaro 
et al., CONSOB 2012).  
 
Legal writings have also expressed contrasting opinions regarding the figure of “minority 
director”. If the presence of minority members within the board of statutory auditors is justified 
by the minority traditional function of controlling management, the same cannot be said 
regarding minority directors within the management board.  
From one side, such representative is deemed fundamental to provide and strengthen minority 
safeguard measures. Minority director role appears crucial especially in large listed companies 
characterized by widely dispersed ownership. In such companies, it is more and more likely 
that the general assembly does not represent a place where shareholder can actively debate and 
affirm their interests and opinions anymore. It is only within the board of directors that 
shareholders’ interests can be affirmed, and decisions taken, that is why it is fundamental to 
have minorities representatives within the board. From the opposite side, concerns regarding 
the function of minority directors have been shown. Particularly, doubts regard the fact that 
they might have only a formal role within the boards, or badly, they might pursue only the 
interest of that part of shareholders which were responsible for their appointment. From this 
perspective, also minority directors might implement collusive behaviours with company 
management and controlling shareholders in order to pursue their personal interests. If this view 
is considered, the compulsory appointment of minority directors within the board, even if 
representing a unique setting, might not necessarily represent an index of improved governance 
of corporations (Alvaro et al., CONSOB 2012).  
 
From a more empirical point of view, it could be said that minority appointed directors, even if 
increasing over time, always constitute a tiny fraction of the board. At the end of 2017, boards 
of directors composed on average by 10 members, have, on average, 1.8 directors appointed by 
minorities (CONSOB Report, 2018). Accordingly, the board is generally governed by majority 
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appointed directors, thus reducing the potential for the implementation of minorities collusive 
behaviours, previously underlined. 
 
In addition, many studies, looking at Italian listed companies, have pointed out the effective 
role of minority appointed directors in influencing company performance, reputation and 
transparency. For instance, a research conducted by Maria Passador in 2018, has investigated 
the impact of minority-independent directors on dividend distribution policies. It has been 
found out that the presence of independent-minority directors, if equal to at least 15% of the 
board, is able to affect dividend policies, influencing positively both the amount and probability 
of their distribution. The positive influence over dividend distribution policies is deemed 
fundamental since firms paying higher dividends and more independent boards can signal their 
better quality to the market, encouraging further investments and economic growth (Passador, 
2018). Furthermore, another study has shown the positive impact of minority appointed 
directors on the quantity and quality of company disclosure. This fundamental result points out 
the effective role of minority directors in protecting and representing investors’ interests and in 
enhancing information transparency of listed companies. More specifically a 10% increase in 
the portion of minority-appointed directors within boards, determines a 14.40% higher 
probability of disclosing relevant information. The positive impact is also evident when 
analysing the quantity of information disclosed: the same increase of the portion of minority 
directors lead to a 3.13% increase in the number of pages of firm major documentations 
(Marchetti et al., 2018). The presence of minority directors has been found to be positively 
associated also with committees meeting frequency. Particularly the positive relation appears 
to be significant with respect to audit committee: the higher number of minority directors 
increases audit committee activity. This relation can be explained by the significant incentives, 
minorities have, in fostering control over management and company operations. Hence, 
according to this perspective, the presence of minority directors is associated with a more 
intensive monitoring activity of the board (D’Onza et al., 2014). Other studies, analysing the 
potential effect of the proportion of independent minority directors on firm value, provide 
evidence of a positive relation between the two variables. Particularly, minority directors are 
found able to alleviate agency costs associated to minority expropriation and self-dealing 






2.5 The comparison between minority and majority candidates’ profiles 
Minority representation systems have the main aim of “opening the boardroom to 
representatives of different constituencies, who have different viewpoints and priorities” 
(Marchetti et al., 2016). The underline assumption behind this trend is that more diverse boards 
are able to positively influence governance structures functioning by improving discussion, 
debate and consequently the decision-making process. Hence, diversity determine an 
enhancement of board effectiveness which in turn lead to higher firm performance (Cater et al., 
2007). Particularly, according to Carter et al. (2007) view, minority directors can be conceived 
as diverse since they provide the board with unique characteristics and viewpoints.  
 
As underlined in the previous paragraphs, empirical researches focusing on the analysis of 
minority directors across Italian listed companies, have shown that they might have a positive 
effect on various aspects of company activities and characteristics. They increase dividend 
distribution, hence firm reputation (Passador, 2018); they enhance quantity and quality of 
company information disclosure (Marchetti et al., 2018); they are able to provide better 
monitoring and also increase firm value (D’Onza et al., 2014, Moscariello et al., 2018). 
However, besides these overall positive influences, minority directors have never been analysed 
with respect to their characteristics and major skills. Recognizing minority directors as diverse 
in theory, it is reasonable to ask whether minority appointed directors possess unique skills and 
capabilities which differentiate them from majority appointed ones, hence increasing board 
diversity.  
 
Because the Italian legal system provides a unique setting of minority representation on the 
board, which allow to make a clear distinction between minorities and majority representatives, 
it is possible to provide an answer to the above question. 
Indeed, thanks to list voting implementation, we can analyse and then compare candidates’ 
profiles presented in minority and majority slates for board of directors’ election and find out 
if potential differences across their profiles exist. In other words, the objective of this thesis is 
to point out whether, or not, there exists differences among minority and majority director’s 
profiles, and whether these differences might have a potential impact on company performance.  
 
Analysing potential differences of minority representatives appears particularly relevant since 
if they are found to have unique features able to positively affect company performance and 
governance structure functioning, having minority representatives within boards would become 
essential to foster corporation growth and development.  
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Therefore, the Italian compulsory provisions concerning minority representation within 
administrative structures might be beneficial also for other companies, and consequently, their 
implementation might be suggested to other jurisdictions.  
 
Hence, the next two chapters, analysing companies, list voting implementation, and majority 





Chapter 3: Research design and preliminary analysis 
 
3.1 Sample definition  
The empirical analysis, on which this thesis is based, looks at list voting implementation and 
minority representation on board of directors of Italian companies, with the major aim of 
identifying potential differences between minority and majority candidates’ profiles.  
 
Since slate voting is a compulsory provision for listed companies, the analysis has been 
conducted by looking at Italian companies listed on the Milan Stoch Exchange. As underlined 
in the previous chapters of this thesis, the actual possibility of having lists submitted by 
minorities is higher in companies characterized by a larger market capitalization (Assonime, 
2012). Indeed, the initial sample considered for the analysis was composed by the 40 companies 
belonging to the FTSE MIB Index, characterized by the highest market capitalization, free float 
capital and liquidity. Furthermore, the analysis only takes into consideration Italian companies, 
in other words, only companies incorporated within the national territory, that for this reason 
are subject to the Italian jurisdiction and legal system. 
 
Besides the large market capitalization, other crucial conditions have been imposed in order to 
adequately define the sample of companies to be analysed.   
The analysis performed aims at studying the implementation of slate voting for directors’ 
appointment in the occurrence of board rotation, which in the Italian system takes place every 
three years. In order to assess the potential impacts of board composition and minority 
appointed directors’ differences (if present) on performance, the analysis only consider 
concluded board tenures. Hence, the examination does not look at current board structures and 
composition but rather at the preceding ones, determined with previous board rotations 
occurring within the triennium 2014-2016.  
In addition, in order to assure consistency in governance dynamics analysed, all companies 
should implement the two-tier horizontal system of administration and control, defined as 
traditional system by the Italian laws and applied by the great majority of Italian listed 
companies: 98% of the total at the end of 2017 (CONSOB Report, 2018).  
Moreover, in order to ensure that the analysis would have been conducted by looking at ordinary 
rather than extraordinary situations and conditions, the sample should not be composed of 
companies undergoing mergers and acquisitions or other relevant restructuring activities during 
the analysed period.   
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According to the defined conditions, the initial sample of 40 highest capitalization companies 
(FTSE MIB Index), has reduced to 26 firms. 
More specifically, of the 14 excluded companies:  
- six are not incorporated in Italy;  
- four do not provide data availability during the considered time span; 
- two apply alternative systems of administration and control; 
- two were interested by merger and acquisition and corporate restructuring activities during 
the considered time frame. 
 
Indeed, in order to restore the initial number of 40 companies to be analysed, the sample of 26 
FTSE MIB companies has been expanded by adding firms on the base of their market 
capitalization, from the highest to the lowest.   
 
The final sample 1is composed by 40 companies: 26, accounting for the 65% of the total, belong 
to the FTSE MIB Index and present an average current market capitalization equal to € 13.85 
billion; while 14 companies, representing the remaining 35%, belong to the FTSE Mid Cap 
Index and have an average market capitalization of € 3.02 billion.  
Indeed, to sum up, all companies of the sample present the following characteristics: 
- have a large current market capitalization ranging between 2 and 75 billion; 
- qualify as S.p.a. in accordance with the Italian legislation; 
- apply the traditional system of administration and control; 
- changed the board within the 2014-2016 period; 
- were not interested by M&A or restructuring activities during the analysed period. 
 
As depicted in the graphs below, the sample identified is quite representative of the whole 
industry classification provided by Borsa Italiana. The only industry not represented in the 
sample is the one of basic materials, anyway not significant also when considering the industry 
classification with respect to the total number of Italian listed companies: indeed, it accounts 
only for the 2% of the total. On the other hand, both at sample and total listed companies’ levels, 
the most represented industries are: industrials, finance and consumer goods. 
 
 
1 The detailed list of companies composing the final sample, as well as of companies excluded from it, is 




Figure 3.1: sample and total listed companies by industry 
   
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
3.2 Data description and sources 
In accordance with the purposes of the study, the examination has been conducted at two 
different levels: the first looks at companies, while the second is concerned with individuals. 
Indeed, also data collection has been structured across these two different levels: data regarding 
40 companies and 462 individuals were collected and then analysed. 
 
With respect to company level, the data identified basically concern: industry, date of board 
rotation, current and historical market capitalization, implementation of list voting procedure, 
ownership and board structure. Industry in which companies operate has been assessed 
considering the sector classification provided by Borsa Italiana. Both current and historical data 
(2014-2016) related to market capitalization, were taken from the AIDA platform. At the same 
time, information related to ownership and board structures were available on the CONSOB 
website, since all listed issuers are obliged to provide quarterly such information to this 
fundamental authority. Instead, data regarding the period of board rotation and the actual 
implementation of the list voting procedure were observed by looking at major company 
documents concerning corporate governance: statutes and shareholder meeting reports. All 
documents were publicly available and presented on corporations’ websites. 
 
When considering individuals, instead, the analysis regards candidates presented in minority or 
majority lists for board election. Data regarding the specific candidates’ profiles were collected 
by analysing their curricula. In fact, directly attached to slates of candidates, companies need 































3.3 Description of Main Variables and Methodology of Analysis 
Given that, as previously stated, the analysis is twofold, it is possible to identify two main sets 
of variables: company level and director level variables. The choice of having a two-level 
analysis mainly derives from the fact that in order to verify if minority representative differ 
from majority ones, it is first necessary to consider other fundamental and more general aspects 
regarding companies. For instance, it is necessary to define who are companies’ minority and 
majority shareholders, whether minorities are “active”, and indeed try to propose candidates to 
the board. In other words, it is crucial to first analyse company level variables that have an 
inherent and significant impact on list voting implementation and minority representation. 
Indeed, only performing what can be defined as a “preliminary analysis”, the subsequent 
possibility of analysing minority and majority candidates is ensured. Hence, in the two 
following sub-paragraphs the two sets of variables are separately described, then major results 
of the preliminary analysis are illustrated.  
 
3.3.1 Company level variables 
The first fundamental variable of analysis for corporations concerns their ownership structures. 
Studying this variable is crucial in order to understand the degree of ownership concentration 
within companies, as well as the nature of company owners, in other words, who directly or 
indirectly control the firm. As far as these two dimensions are concerned, ownership structures 
of companies have been analysed in accordance to the model provided by La Porta et al. (1999). 
Their definition of ownership relied on voting rights, indeed the analysis looks at the “voting 
capital” ownership percentages, provided by the CONSOB for each issuer. Moreover, they 
classify firms into two major groups: widely held companies, and companies with ultimate 
owners. If a firm classify as widely held it means it has no controlling shareholder. But, how to 
define a controlling shareholder? In general terms it can be defined as the owner of 50% of 
companies outstanding shares, anyway especially in large public companies a shareholder 
owning much less than 50% of shares can be still defined in charge of control or significant 
influence on company operations. In fact, La Porta et al., in their research used two possible 
arbitrary cut-offs equal to 20% and 10%. According to their view, any shareholder, whose direct 
or indirect ownership exceeded, in separate observations, the 20% or 10%, was qualified as 
controlling shareholder. In the cases in which a controlling shareholder could not be identified, 
the company classified as widely held type of ownership, in the opposite case, instead, the 
company had an ultimate owner. They further identified five types of ultimate owners: family 
or individual; Government; widely held financial institutions; widely held corporation; 
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miscellaneous, intended as “cooperative, voting trust, or a group with no single controlling 
investor” (La Porta et al., 1999). 
 
With reference to the model provided by La Porta et al. (1999), this analysis only considers a 
controlling ownership cut-off of 20%, given that Italian companies are generally characterized 
by very concentrated ownership structures and large controlling shareholders (D’Onza et al., 
2014). Furthermore, with respect to the five categories of ultimate owners, only the first four 
are taken as references. Indeed, the “miscellaneous” typology is excluded, given that it is just 
viewed as a residual category: indeed, accounting for slightly more of 5% of the total sample 
of companies (La Porta et al., 1999).  
 
Ownership data were taken from the CONSOB website and are related to the periods before the 
scheduled general shareholder meetings in which the board is appointed. In performing the 
analysis, it was first assessed whether companies classify within the widely held or ultimate 
owner categories. Hence, according to the 20% cut off, companies in which no ownership 
percentages exceed the defined threshold, were qualified as widely held and were assigned a 
value equal to one, zero in the opposite case (ownership percentage higher than 20%).  
Then, with respect to the ultimate owners’ category, the specific kind of owners were identified. 
As ultimate owner, the analysis considers the shareholder with the highest ownership 
percentage (above 20%), intended as the individual or entity which is ahead of the potential 
ownership chain. Hence, the examination does not look only at direct shareholders, but rather 
at the “declarant” of ownership rights, as defined by ownership structures provided by the 
CONSOB. So, each company belonging to the ultimate owners’ category has been assigned a 
value equal to one if the controlling shareholder is either represented by: 
- a person or a family; 
- a domestic of foreign State; 
- a financial institution, such as banks and insurance companies; 
- a non-financial corporation. 
 
The second variable used for company level analysis is the implementation of list voting. As 
previously underlined, list voting is a compulsory voting mechanism for listed companies: 
company officers are appointed by voting lists of candidates. However, there is no compulsory 
requirement for what concern the presentation of more lists of candidates. In other words, the 
submission of other slates, in addition to the one presented by the controlling shareholder, is 
only a possibility: indeed, a potential right that minorities can choose to exercise or not.  
62 
 
Hence, the implementation of list voting, intended as the submission of lists by minority 
shareholders, represents a crucial variable to study in order to understand to what extent 
minorities are actually represented, or actively participate the board election process. In these 
terms, this variable is able to provide a measure of the level of minority shareholder activism 
within Italian listed companies.  
 
To analyse the described variable, it was first necessary to identify, for each company of the 
sample, the date of board rotation. Hence, the study looks at the number of candidates’ slates 
presented by shareholders in each company. Then, by considering the list proponents, and their 
related ownership percentages, slates are classified as majority or minority. More specifically, 
one list is qualified as “majority list” if it is proposed by the controlling shareholder, previously 
identified through the ownership structure analysis. While, a list qualifies as “minority list” if 
it is presented by any other shareholder, different from the controlling one. In widely held 
companies, in which the controlling shareholder is not directly identifiable, the list presented 
by the shareholder holding the highest ownership percentage is qualified as the majority one. 
  
It is worth underline that, the criteria of classification used in this case, based on ownership 
percentages of the list proponents, is different from the one generally applied and defined by 
the Italian law and by the Governance Code. In fact, they rather consider an electoral criterion 
according to which lists are qualified as majority or minority slates in relation to the number of 
votes obtained during the general shareholder meeting (Assonime, 2012).  
The ownership criterion allows to classify a list submitted for board election ex ante, indeed 
before the general assembly, during which slates are voted. On the other hand, the electoral 
criterion only allows for a classification ex post of the previously submitted slates. Beside this 
difference, on the base of the one-share one vote principle, it is to some extent reasonable to 
assume that lists submitted classify in the same way, whatever the criteria applied. In other 
words, the list submitted by the largest shareholder, qualified as majority according to the 
ownership criterion, will also receive the highest portion of votes during shareholder meetings, 
hence qualifying as majority also according to the electoral one. However, it is not always the 
case. It could happen that lists presented by minority shareholders, such as institutional 
investors, might receive significant support by capturing votes of other minorities, which even 
if not directly submitting the list may be interested in blocking the controlling owners. It has 
been reported that, in recent cases, minority lists received more votes with respect to the lists 
submitted by controlling shareholders (Ventoruzzo and Marchetti, 2016). For instance, in the 
occurrence of the 2015 board election of Unicredit S.p.a., the list submitted by institutional 
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investors, owning together 1.91% of company outstanding shares, has received the great 
majority of votes, accounting to 54.64% of the share capital represented during the general 
assembly (Unicredit S.p.a. Shareholder meeting Report, 13/05/2015). Hence, in this case, the 
list submitted by minorities, would classify as majority slate according to the electoral criterion. 
For the purpose of the analysis conducted, slates of candidates are only classified according to 
ownership percentages held by lists underwriters.   
 
Furthermore, in order to determine the ownership percentage needed by minority shareholder 
to propose slates of candidates to the board, data regarding market capitalization were collected 
for each company. Within this context, the analysis looks at company historical market 
capitalization, considered at the specific year in which board rotation has occurred. Then, 
required ownership percentages were defined in accordance to the previously cited article 144-
quarter of “Regolamento emittenti”, issued by the CONSOB.  
 
3.3.2 Director-level variables 
At the individual level of analysis, candidates presented in both majority and minority lists were 
screened across several variables of analysis. 
The first variable which has been assessed is the level of information disclosed within their 
curricula, always attached to lists presented and published. Given that no specific requirement, 
regarding types and amount of information disclosure, has been established by the Italian 
regulator, it is reasonable to assume that different candidates might provide different kind of 
information, as well as smaller or larger amounts.  Indeed, this first variable of analysis is 
defined as “information disclosure” and it assumes value of 1 if the candidate curriculum 
classifies as detailed, 0 otherwise. Within this context, it is worth underlining the meaning 
attributed to the adjective detailed. A curriculum qualifies as detailed if at least three sections 
can be recognized: personal and general data, study and work background, current positions. 
On the other hand, curricula classify as not detailed if one of the three sections described is not 
present or if relevant information do not emerge clearly.  
 
Candidates were also analysed across general variables: their gender, age and nationality. 
Particularly regarding age, it was considered with respect to the year of board rotation. 
Moreover, for candidates qualified as Italian, a further distinction has been made: they were 




Another fundamental variable analysed is independence. Article 147-ter of T.U.F, fourth 
comma, states that: “at least one member of the board of directors, or two if the board is made 
of more than seven members, must comply with the independence requirements defined by 
article 148 T.U.F, third comma, as well as with any other independence requirement requested 
by company bylaws and by codes of conduct issued by professional associations or by financial 
market regulators”. Indeed, in the definition and related assessment of candidates’ 
independence, it is necessary to look at two different perspectives: one shaped by the Italian 
legislator at article 148 T.U.F., and the other defined by the Italian Code of Good Corporate 
Governance, issued by Borsa Italiana.  
Article 148 T.U.F., third comma affirms that directors do not classify as independent if they 
have family ties (spouse or relatives within the fourth grade) with company executives and 
relevant representatives or if they are linked to the company, or to its controlled entities, by 
financial, professional or employment relationships. Furthermore, the Code issued by Borsa 
Italiana, suggests and specify that any direct or indirect commercial, financial or professional 
relationships with the company, its controlled entities or relevant officers, should have not 
occurred during the whole preceding year (article 3.C.1, letter c).  
In addition to family ties and material business relationships, article 3.C.1 of the Code states 
that directors should not qualify as independent if: 
- they can, directly or indirectly, exercise control or a significant influence over the company; 
- in the preceding three years, they assumed relevant offices within the company or in its 
controlled entities;  
- they have assumed the office of company directors for more than nine years in the last 
twelve. 
Indeed, the independence variable has been assessed by considering both requirements in a 
separate manner. So, it is possible to define two variables for independence: “law 
independence” and “code independence”. A candidate who qualify as independent for the law 
requirements is assigned a score of 1, 0 otherwise. The same happens for the code independence 
variable.  
 
The fourth main variable of analysis for candidates is education. It has been assessed either in 
a quantitative and qualitative way, by observing the number of qualifications held as well as 
the field of study, respectively. In relation to the quantitative variable, the qualifications held 
were summed for each candidate. Qualifications considered, were only the ones subsequent to 
the standard high school diploma, indeed: bachelors’ and master’s degrees, PHDs, and other 
masters or specializations of either first and second levels. Hence, if a candidate only held a 
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high school diploma is assigned a score of 0, while for every of the cited qualifications 
possessed he is assigned a score of 1. Concerning the qualitative variable, five major fields of 
studies were identified: economic, representing studies dealing with the general economy, 
management, finance and political sciences; legal  representing legal studies; scientific, dealing 
with all scientific subjects, such as engineering, physics, math or natural sciences; humanistic, 
representing any area concerning human being and the study of their cultural and historical 
setting; other, representing any other study area not described by the previous categories. In the 
cases in which candidates hold more than one qualification belonging to different study areas, 
the latter are linked together. Indeed, it is possible to observe bundled categories such as: 
scientific/economic; law/economic etc.  
 
Finally, candidates were analysed with respect to their skills. Candidates’ skills have been 
assessed by taking inspiration from the classification provided by Adams et al., (2018), who 
identify 20 skills categories to describe and map directors. For the purpose of this analysis, only 
the most relevant skills categories have been taken into consideration, thus the set of 20 reduces 
to 14 skills. A more precise definition of each of the 14 skills analysed is presented in the table 
below.  
 
Table 3.1: skills categories and related description 
 Skill Description 
1 Academic The candidate is, or has been, a university professor. 
2 Company business The candidate is experienced with company business or 
industry. 
3 Entrepreneurial The candidate is an entrepreneur, or founder of other 
companies and activities. 
4 Finance and accounting The candidate has experience in finance, accounting and other 
related activities. 
5 Governance The candidate has experience in governance structures. 
6 Government and policy The candidate has policy related experience. 
7 Human resources The candidate has worked in the field of human resources. 
8 International The candidate has studied or worked abroad. 
9 Legal The candidate has legal expertise. 
10 Management The candidate has management or executive experience. 
11 Marketing The candidate has marketing and sales expertise. 
12 Operations The candidate has experience with production and logistic 
functions. 
13 Risk management The candidate has risk management or insurance expertise. 





Hence, for each of the 14 skills described, a point equal to 1 is assigned to the candidate owning 
the specific skill, while zero points are assigned if the specific skill is not representative of the 
candidate analysed. Then, for each candidate the number of total skills owned is computed 
simply by summing scores previously attributed.   
It is worth underlining that the governance skill has been assessed by considering both the two 
major corporate governance structures characterizing Italian companies: the board of directors, 
and the board of statutory auditors. Indeed, the governance skill is comprehensive of both 
experience as director or company supervisor, which anyway were assessed separately, given 
the intrinsic different characteristics of functions performed.  
Furthermore, with respect to this variable, candidates were also analysed according to the 
number of current offices they held in other companies. In relation to the term “other 
companies”, the analysis takes only into consideration firms different from the ones for which 
candidates would potentially be appointed as directors. Indeed, also companies belonging to 
the same group (controlling or controlled entities) are considered. While, offices held in 
foundations, associations and any other entities different from corporations are not examined. 
Offices considered are three: executive role, indeed represented by CEOs; board, intended as 
any type of role assumed within the board of directors; other, identified with supervisory and 
control roles.  
 
3.4 Preliminary Analysis & Results 
3.4.1 Ownership structures  
With respect to ownership structures, by applying the methodology previously described to the 
analysed sample, it is possible to observe that only 6 companies out of 40, and accounting to 
the 15% are classified as widely held. The remaining 85%, indeed has controlling owners.  
This result is not totally in line with the one provided by La Porta et al., (1999), given that 
according to their findings, widely held companies represent more than one-third (36%) of their 
total sample. However, it is worth underlining that a strict and close comparison of the two 
analyses is not possible since the study conducted by La Porta et al., observes a much larger 
sample, made of 540 companies from 27 different countries.  
 
Anyway, from a slightly different perspective, results can be considered aligned by looking at 
the most diffused controlling owners: both for La Porta et al., and for the current analysis, 
family-controlled and State-controlled companies account for the largest portion (30% and 18% 
respectively for La Porta et al., 1999). Hence, by looking at the pie-chart below, it is evident 
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that, also in Italy, the most diffused types of ownership are: widely, family and state held 
structures.  
 
Figure 3.2: companies by ownership structure 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
More specifically, considering the ultimate owners’ categories, families and individuals control 
accounts for the great majority, equal to 52.5% of the total sample, this result is also in line with 
the view provided by Bhaumic and Gregoriou (2010) pointing out the great spread of family 
control businesses across several countries. The second fundamental category of ultimate 
owners is represented by the Government, accounting for the 22.5%; while financial and non-
financial corporation control types are the least diffused, only accounting to three and one 
companies in the sample, respectively (7.5% and 2.5% of the total sample).  
 
Generally speaking, the finding that the 85% of companies in the sample present ultimate 
owners corroborates the idea that the dispersed ownership, represented by widely held 
corporations, is not always identifiable as the dominant ownership structure for companies. In 
fact, in many countries, ownership structures are rather concentrated, with families and 
Governments as main ultimate owners (La Porta et al., 1999).  
 
Particularly, Italian companies’ ownership structures are characterized by large controlling 
shareholders (D’Onza et al., 2014). Indeed, the average ownership percentage of companies 
controlling shareholders is equal to 39.30%, with minimum and maximum values equal to 
22.45% and 73.35%, respectively. When considering the distribution of ownership, it is evident 
that the largest portion of companies, equal to 47.5% has controlling shareholders owning more 
than half of the firm share capital. Indeed, testifying the significant ownership concentration in 










Figure 3.3: ownership distribution of controlling shareholders 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Furthermore, by looking at the most relevant ownership types by industry, it is worth 
underlining that widely held companies mainly belongs to the finance sector. Four companies 
out of the total amount of six, are banks (2) insurance companies (1) investment services 
corporation (1). Besides the partial differences in the specific activities performed, they are all 
participated by national or foreign financial institutions or funds and are characterized by a 
relevant portion of free-floating capital, on average equal to 78.60%, significantly above 
48.79%, representing the average data for the whole sample.  
On the other hand, family owned businesses are quite dispersed across all industries, 
particularly in the ones of consumer goods and industrials, in which they account for seven and 
six companies out of 21, respectively. At the same time, government ownership is mainly 
concentrated in companies operating in utilities and oil and gas industries.  
 
Figure 3.4: relevant ownership structures by industry 
 





















These results are in line with the ownership structures-industry relations identified in literature: 
it has been observed that ownership by families and single individuals is significant in consumer 
goods industry, particularly in the textile, clothing and standardized goods sectors; while 
government ownership is more frequent in sectors dealing with public and private commodities, 
indeed electricity production and transmission, water collection and treatment, as well as coal, 
oil and other energies supply (Thomsen and Pedersen, 1999).   
 
3.4.2 List voting implementation 
As previously stated, all companies in the sample elected their boards within the three years 
period 2014-2016. More specifically, 17 companies (42.5%) appointed new directors in 2014, 
while the remaining 10 (25%) and 13 (32.5%) companies, in 2015 and in 2016 respectively.  
The minimum ownership percentage requested for submission of minority slates ranges 
between 0.5% and 2.5% across the sample. However, for the great majority of companies, 33 
out of 40, it is equal to 1%; while only for 5 and 2 companies, it amounts to 0.5% and 2.5% 
respectively.  
 
During the analysed period, the 40 companies of the sample have submitted 78 lists of 
candidates for board election. Out of this total, 77 lists were submitted by shareholders, while 
one list, in only one company (Prysmian S.p.a.), was submitted by the outgoing board of 
directors. According to the previous defined discriminatory criterion, that list could not be 
qualified as either belonging to the minority or majority category, since it is not submitted by 
shareholders. Anyway, only for this specific situation, the electoral discriminatory criterion is 
applied: the list is classified as a “majority” one, since it received the highest portion of votes, 
amounting to 77.93% of total shares represented during the general assembly (Prysmian S.p.a. 
Shareholders meeting Report 16/04/2015). Hence, of the total 78 slates submitted, 40 were 
classified as “majority slates”, while the remaining 38 as “minority” ones.  
 
Besides the almost equal number, minority slates were not submitted by all companies in the 
analysed sample. In fact, minorities choose to present their representative for board appointment 
in the 75% of the total sample, hence in 30 companies out of the total 40. In the remaining 25% 
of analysed companies, lists were only submitted by the controlling shareholder, hence they 




Among the 30 companies submitting minority slates, it is more frequent that minorities only 
present one slate of their representative: this has occurred in the 76.7% of companies. Instead, 
only few, accounting for the 20%, have submitted two slates, and just one company three.  
A great portion of minority lists, equal to the 68.42% of the total, was presented by investors, 
trough Assogestioni. The latter, is the main Italian association of asset management companies, 
founded in 1984, with the aim of protecting, assisting and counselling investors. Its main 
associates are represented by the great majority of Italian asset management companies (SGR), 
foreign investment management companies operating in Italy, as well as banks and other 
financial institutions which provide their customers with those investment services. The 
remaining portion of minority lists, accounting for the 31.58% of the total, was presented by 
other corporations or entities which qualify as minority owners, but do not belong to the 
institutional investors’ category.  
 
Figure 3.5: companies by number of minority lists submitted and by underwriters  
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Institutional investors presenting lists have an average ownership percentage equal to 1.62%, 
ranging between the minimum and maximal values of 0.70% - 3.37%. Other minorities, instead, 
present a higher average ownership equal to 5.35%, and indeed a significantly higher maximum 
value equal to 12.48%. In four companies, institutional investors do not present any list. Two 
of these companies are characterized by “strong” minority shareholders, holding on average 8% 
of equity: indeed, a significant ownership percentage for minorities, that at total sample level 
present an average ownership equal to 4.2%. Furthermore, three out of four, have particularly 
concentrated structures, in which the controlling owner holds more than half of share capital, 
while the free-floating capital, amounting to an average value of 25%, is significantly lower if 


















perspective, institutional investors might be discouraged to present their lists of candidates in 
presence of strong controlling owners and strong minorities.    
 
Lists submitted by majority shareholders are composed by a larger number of candidates: on 
average equal to 11.77, with minimum and maximum values of 6 and 21 respectively. Minority 
lists, instead, are composed on average by 2.87 individuals, however ranging from a minimum 
of 1 to a maximum of 9. Moreover, a great portion of minority slates, accounting to 39.47% is 
composed by three candidates. The three-candidates lists are more frequently submitted by 
institutional investors, while other minorities tend to submit slates with either a higher or lower 
number of candidates.  
 
Both for minority mad majority lists submitted, it is possible to underline a significant relation 
between the ownership rights of the list underwriters and the number of candidates proposed 
within such lists. In fact, controlling shareholder propose lists with the highest number of 
candidates since they are identified as corporation ultimate owners, however, this also occur 
among minorities different from institutional investors. For instance, minorities slates 
proposing a number of candidates between 5 and 9, are characterized by an average ownership 
percentage equal to 7.5%, significantly above the sample average value of 2.80%.  
Furthermore, on average majority lists appoint 10.3 directors on the board, while minority lists 
only 1.71 directors. This data is explained by the intrinsic characteristics of the list voting 
mechanism: directors are appointed in a progressive manner from the list receiving the larger 
portion of votes, with few seats reserved to minorities. Since the list casting the higher portion 
of votes is generally the one submitted by majority shareholders, it is plausible to obtain the 
previously described result. Hence, the larger the ownership rights, the larger the number of 
candidates presented in the lists, and the consequent higher possibility of appointing those 
candidates as board members.  
 
3.4.3 Companies submitting a unique slate 
Given that the law provides minorities with the possibility to propose and appoint their 
representatives on the board of directors, when such possibility is not used, it is straightforward 
to ask why. In other words, what are the reasons why minorities might choose to not present 
slates of candidates, hence refusing the exercise of one of their fundamental rights?  




In order to answer these questions, it appears fundamental to provide a more detailed 
description of the ten “unique list companies” identified in our sample.  
These are presented in the table below. 
 
Table 2: companies submitting a unique list 
1 ASTM S.p.a. 6 I.M.A. S.p.a. 
2 Azimut Holding S.p.a. 7 Interpump Group S.p.a. 
3 Brunello Cucinelli S.p.a. 8 Juventus FC S.p.a. 
4 De’Longhi S.p.a. 9 Reply S.p.a. 
5 Diasorin S.p.a. 10 Salvatore Ferragamo S.p.a. 
  
By looking at market capitalization, the ten companies present an average capitalization equal 
to almost 2 billion, with minimum and maximum values respectively equal to 270 million and 
almost 3.70 billion. The average capitalization is fairly lower if compared with the one related 
to the thirty companies submitting minority slates: indeed, equal to almost 8 billion.  
Furthermore, when considering their current market capitalization, the 40% belongs to the 
FTSE MIB index, while the remaining 60% to the FTSE Mid Cap. By considering the portion 
of FTSE MIB and FTSE Mid Cap companies in the total sample (26 and 14 respectively), 
companies presenting a unique slate of candidates account for the 15.38% and 42.85% 
respectively. Indeed, in almost half of FTSE Mid Cap companies of the sample, minorities 
choose to not submit slates. This feature, suggesting that in smaller capitalization companies is 
more frequent that minorities chose to not exercise their representation right on the board, is in 
line with previous empirical researches on Italian listed companies (Assonime 2012), as well 
as with one of the major conditions considered in the sample definition. 
 
Considering industries, it is possible to observe that a great portion of such companies operates 
within consumer goods and industrial sectors. However, given that the subset of companies is 
representative of almost all industries considered, the industry variable could not be viewed as 
a distinctive feature of unique slate companies.   
 
More interestingly, the 90% of companies has an ultimate owner, identifiable with families or 
individuals. It is important to notice that this portion of companies account for almost the half 
of the family owned firms in the sample: about 43%. Hence, it seems that the family/individual 
ownership type might be able to affect the minorities choices of whether submitting or not their 
slates. This finding is consistent with the view proposed by Assonime survey 2012, according 
to which the submission of minority slates can be observed with lower frequency in family held 




Figure 3.6: unique list companies by industry and by ownership type 
   
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Given the relevance of the owners type potential impact, it has been deemed necessary to further 
and deeply analyse the ownership structures of such companies.  
 
Firstly, the unique widely held company of the group is Azimut Holding S.p.a., which operates 
in the finance sector, and belongs to the FTSE MIB Index. In relation to its ownership structure, 
it presents the highest free-floating capital of the sample equal to the 85.24% of company share 
capital. The remaining portion of capital is hold by four entities, mainly represented by financial 
institutions as well as investment management corporations. All the four entities hold shares 
for asset management purposes, rather than at ownership title. Indeed, according to such 
ownership structure it is not possible to clearly identify neither majority nor minority 
shareholders. In occurrence of board election 2016, the unique list submitted for director’ 
appointment was presented by Timone Fiduciaria S.r.l., a company representing several 
shareholders participating the Shareholders’ Agreement of Azimut Holding S.p.a. and 
accounting for a total of 13.17% of ordinary shares (Azimut Holding S.p.a. Shareholder meeting 
Report, 28/04/2016). According to Assonime 2012, the possibility of minority list submission 
also depends on the presence of qualified ownership percentages, that however, in widely held 














widely held family owned
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In relation to the other nine family owned companies submitting a unique slate, the table below 
provides more detailed information regarding their controlling shareholders and related 
ownership percentage.  
 
Table 3.3: family owned companies submitting a unique list 
Company Controlling shareholder Ownership % 
ASTM S.p.a. Aurelia S.r.l. 53.93% 
Brunello Cucinelli S.p.a. Cucinelli Brunello 63.32% 
De’Longhi S.p.a. The Long E trust 62.00% 
Diasorin S.p.a. FINDE SS 44.10% 
I.M.A. S.p.a. Lopam Fin S.p.a. 66.22% 
Interpump Group S.p.a. IPG Holding S.r.l. 26.29% 
Juventus FC S.p.a. Giovanni Agnelli S.a.p.a. 60.00% 
Reply S.p.a. Rizzante Mario 53.55% 
Salvatore Ferragamo S.p.a. Ferragamo Finanziaria S.p.a. 54.71% 
 
 
In all companies, except for two, controlling shareholders present ownership percentage above 
50%, and all above the average controlling ownership percentage of the total sample, equal to 
39.04%. It is very frequent in the Italian context that families indirectly control companies 
through pyramidal structures (Bhaumic and Gregoriou, 2010). In fact, with respect to the 
analysed subset, family financial holdings assume control in 5 firms, identified in the table 
below. 
 
Table 3.4: companies submitting a unique list by controlling family  
Company Holding Related family 
ASTM S.p.a. Aurelia S.r.l. Gavio 
Diasorin S.p.a. FINDE SS Denegri 
I.M.A. S.p.a. Lopam Fin S.p.a. Vacchi 
Interpump Group S.p.a. IPG Holding S.r.l. Montipò 
Salvatore Ferragamo S.p.a. Ferragamo Finanziaria S.p.a. Ferragamo 
 
In other three companies, the ultimate owners are individuals: Cucinelli, Agnelli and Rizzante, 
owners of Brunello Cunicelli S.p.a., Juventus FC S.p.a. and Reply S.p.a., respectively.  
For what concerns De’Longhi S.p.a., instead, the ultimate controlling shareholder is a trust, 
whose beneficiaries are indeed members of the De’Longhi family.  
 
For what concerns minorities, in nine companies the minimal ownership percentage requested 
by the CONSOB for lists submission was equal to 1%, with the only exception of Juventus FC 
S.p.a. for which it was equal to 2.5%, given the lower market capitalization. By looking at 
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companies’ ownership structure, it is possible to observe that, in nine companies out of ten, all 
relevant minorities had the minimum level of ownership percentage requested by article 144-
quarter (Regolamento emittenti, CONSOB). Only Salvatore Ferragamo S.p.a. has four minority 
shareholders holding less than 1% of share capital (between 0.537% and 0.838%), however 
these minorities are family members, indeed the lacked submission of lists appears to be 
reasonable, since their interests might be considered in line with the one represented by the 
controlling shareholder.  
 
Hence, it is possible to say that the lacked submission of minority slates cannot be attributed to 
the too high ownership percentages requested either by law or company’ charters. In fact, in 
relation to this unique requirement, all company’ minorities could have exercised their right.   
A possible reason could be attributed to the general discouragement of minorities with respect 
to strong and large controlling shareholders. It is worth underline that the list preparation and 
submission do not come at zero costs for shareholders. Hence, it is probable that, by feeling the 
impossibility of electing their representatives, minorities might choose to not present lists in 
order to avoid useless costs. Other possible hypothesis could be represented by a more general 
disregard of minorities: they might be simply not interested in influencing company activities 
and obtaining a “voice” in the board.  
 
It is also important to underline that, given the absence of lists submitted by minority 
shareholders, these ten companies have been excluded from the subsequent analysis focusing 
on candidate individual level. Hence, in order to ensure the possibility of comparing majority 
and minority candidates’ profiles, only the 68 slates presented by the remaining thirty 






































Chapter 4: Do minority representatives differ? 
 
4.1 Majority and minority candidates’ profiles 
The examination looks at 462 candidates: 353, accounting for 76% of the total, belong to the 
majority group, while the remaining 109 are classified as minority candidates. In the following 
sections, a detail description of candidates’ profiles is provided across the main variable of 
analysis considered.  
 
Information disclosure 
Among the total 462 candidates’ curricula analysed, 341 were classified as detailed, while the 
remaining 121 as not detailed, given the significant lower amount of information disclosed. 
Generally, detailed curricula are presented in standard formats: either represented by the 
widespread “Europass”, either through formats provided by the company, indeed, in this case 
equal for all candidates of the list. On the other hand, the undetailed ones were structured as 
short biographies of few lines, half page or simply as short series of bullet points.  
Regarding the majority-minority distinction, the largest portion of majority candidates, 
accounting to the 67% of the total, submit detailed curricula, while the remaining one-third does 
not. When considering minority candidates, the 95% provide detailed information, with just 5 
candidates submitting non-detailed curricula. Hence, even if in both groups the majority of 
candidates provide an overall adequate level of personal information, the correct disclosure 
practice is strikingly higher for minorities, submitting almost only detailed curricula.  
 
The interesting aspect to notice is that the low level of disclosure tends to coincide with cases 
of reappointment within the board. In fact, upon the total of 121 non-detailed curricula, 84, 
accounting for almost the 70%, were submitted by candidates who had already been appointed 
as directors during the previous board rotation. This relation is definitely a typical pattern for 
the majority group: of the total 84 undetailed/re-elected curricula, 83 belong to majority 
candidates. By analysing cases of re-election at a more general level, it is possible to observe 
that the total number of reappointed directors is equal to 211, hence almost half of the total 
observations. Moreover, also in this case, reappointment is more frequent for the majority 




Another crucial link is the one existent between low level of information disclosure and lacked 
compliance with both types of independent requirements. Hence, out of the total 121 non-
detailed curricula, 60 (50%) were submitted by non-independent majority candidates, while 
only one by a non-independent minority representative. In other words, also the presence of 
family ties, material business relations with the company, or any other relation that might 
determine a condition of dependence, are able to influence the level of information disclosure 
of candidates.  
 
General information 
For what concerns the majority pool of candidates, the 69% is male. They have an average age 
equal to 56.20, computed at the date of list submission. The great majority, about 91%, classify 
as Italian, indeed only the remining 9% has a different nationality. With respect to the Italian 
group of candidates, the greatest portion of 229 individuals, representing the 71%, was born in 
the North of Italy, while only the 20% and 8% is native of Central and Southern regions 
respectively. In relation to minorities, it is possible to observe that the 64% of the total 109 
candidates is male. They present an average age equal to 54.88 years old. The 94% classify as 
Italian, of which the 58% is native of North of Italy, while the 29% and 13% comes from Centre 
and South, respectively.  
 
Figure 4.1: Majority and minority candidates by general information 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
By comparing the two groups, it is quite evident that the overall distribution of candidates is 
similar: across both groups the majority of candidates is male, Italian and was born in the North 
of Italy. However, it is still possible to notice slight differences: minorities candidates are 











same time, they also account for higher portion of candidates native of Italian central and 
southern regions and are on average slightly younger.  
 
Independence  
Among the majority group the 58% and 57% of candidates qualify as independent according to 
the independence requirements provided by the T.U.F. and by the Code respectively. At the 
same time, almost the total amount of minority candidates, accounting for the 96%, qualify as 
independent.  
 
Figure 4.2: minority and majority candidates by independence requirements 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
More specifically, 105 minority candidates qualify as independent for both requirements, while 
only 4 as non-independent for both. In relation to the majority subset, 183 candidates, 
accounting to almost 52% of the total, comply with both rules, while 131 do not. However, 
there are also few cases in which candidates qualify as independent only according to one of 
the two requirements.  
 
Figure 4.3: majority candidates independence distribution 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 















With respect to education, majority candidates have an average number of qualifications equal 
to 1.22. The same data is slightly higher for the minority group: indeed, equal to 1.50. The 
number of qualifications held ranges from 0 to a maximum of 4, for both groups. The figure 
below shows the distribution of majority and minority candidates by number of qualifications 
held.  
 
Figure 4.4: majority and minority candidates by number of qualifications 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Once again, the general trend for both the subsets is similar: the greatest portion of candidates 
(63.2% and 50.5%) hold one title, followed by two titles. At the same time, for both groups, 
candidates holding four qualifications are rather rare. However, besides the similarities, it is 
possible to notice that the portion of untitled candidates is clearly higher for the majority group: 
11.3% compared with 6.4% of minorities, hence representing almost the double amount. 
Furthermore, also the fraction of candidates holding three titles is higher for minorities: indeed, 
justifying their slightly higher average number of qualifications held.  
 
Even in relation to the field of study, minority and majority candidates present a similar trend. 
In fact, for both groups, the most common background, accounting for more than 40%, is the 
economic one, encompassing all management and business administration disciplines as well 
as the areas of political sciences, insurance and risk management. Other frequent fields of 
studies are law and science: legal studies have been attended by the 16% of majority candidates 
and by the 18% of minority ones; while scientific disciplines have been studied by the 13% and 
16% of majority and minority candidates respectively. While, in both groups, humanistic 
disciplines and all other subjects, which cannot be classified in the previously cited fields, are 













Figure 4.5: minority and majority candidates by field of study 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Moreover, some candidates of either group, holding more than one qualification, have different 
study backgrounds, indeed classified in three main categories, as reported in the graph above. 
As clearly shown in the figure, scientific/economic studies accounts for the great portion of 
both minority and majority candidates holding more than one title. 
 
Skills  
The total sample of analysed individuals accounts for 3.69 skills on average, where the 
maximum number of skills empirically recognized to each candidate is equal to 7, out of the 
total 14 skills categories. As depicted in the figure above, the greatest portion of both groups of 
candidates, accounting to almost the 35% of the total owns 4 skills. Only one candidate, 
belonging to the majority subset, owns 7 skills.   
 
Figure 4.6: percentages of majority and minority candidates by number of skills  
 
Source: author’s elaboration 

























However, the average majority candidate presents 3.67 skills, while the one representative of 
minorities accounts for a slightly higher average number of skills, equal to 3.73. Among the 14 
skills categories, the most relevant for both subsets, even if with a partially different order, are 
represented by: company business, finance and accounting, governance, international and 
management.  
 
Figure 4.7: minority and majority candidates by skill category  
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Particularly, the most significant skill for all candidates is the one of Governance, accounting 
for the 78% and 81% of majority and minority candidates respectively. Since the Italian 
jurisdiction recognize two major bodies of corporate governance within companies, this skill 
can be further decomposed into: board experience and supervisory experience. 
 
Figure 4.8: minority and majority candidates by governance skill 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 






















From the figure above it is evident that a great portion of either minority and majority 
candidates, accounting to the 75%, has previously joined the board of directors as ordinary or 
also as executive member (chairman and vice-chairman). Experience as auditors or controller 
is instead less frequent for both groups.  
The widespread experience within board of directors is to some extent confirmed by looking at 
candidates’ current offices in other companies. Firstly, the great majority of both groups of 
candidates, accounting to 73% and 68% (respectively for majority and minority), hold at least 
one office in other companies. Particularly, the most spread office type is the one of board 
member: in both groups the 85% of candidates hold such role.  
 
4.2 Elected and non-elected majority and minority candidates 
Besides the distinction between majority and minority, candidates might also be classified as 
elected or non-elected, with respect to board election results.  
Out of the total of 462, 374 candidates, accounting for almost the 81%, have been appointed as 
directors. In relation to majority candidates: 309, accounting for the 88%, were elected on the 
board, while the remaining portion of 44 (12%) classify as non-elected. At the same time, 
among the 109 minority candidates, only the 60% is elected.  
 
Considering this further classification of candidates, while no significant variation has been 
observed in relation to general information and independence, interesting results can be found 
with respect to candidates’ education and skills. 
 
Figure 4.9: average number of qualifications and skills of candidates 
  




















































Hence, concerning the level of education, the elected-majority has an average number of 
qualifications equal to 1.19, slightly lower if compared with the 1.39 of the non-elected majority 
members. On the other hand, it is possible to observe the inverted trend for the minority subset: 
indeed, the elected-minority hold an average number of qualifications equal to 1.55, slightly 
higher than the one of non-elected minorities, amounting to 1.41.  
Regarding average skills, instead, for both minority and majority groups, elected candidates can 
be considered more skilled, accounting for an average number of skills of 3.72 and 3.94, for 
majority and minority respectively. These numbers are slightly higher if compared with the 
ones of non-elected candidates, 3.36 and 3.43 for majority and minority respectively.  
 
Even if for both variables the differences are not significant, these results point out that elected 
candidates of either majority or minority subsets can be considered more skilled. More 
precisely, minority candidates elected own on average slightly more skills and a higher number 
of qualifications with respect to the elected-majority group. 
 
4.3 Elected board analysis 
Data regarding single candidates elected from both majority and minority groups can be 
aggregated at board level for each company. Elected boards have on average 12.47 members. 
Boards average size also varies across industry, particularly it is higher in financial services 
corporations (16.17), while lower in all other non-financial sectors (11.54). 
 
On average the 68% of elected directors is male, with an average age equal to almost 54 years. 
Furthermore the 91% of directors is Italian, mainly native of northern regions. Executive 
directors, intended as CEO, Chairman and Vice Chairman, are on average 2.63 and are always 
representatives of majority lists. Furthermore, only in 9 companies out of 30, there is at least 
one female executive director. On average the 60% of appointed directors qualify as 
independent, particularly, this data is always confirmed (100%) for minorities.  
 
The average number of directors elected from minority slates is equal to 2.17. It also varies 
across different industries and in relation to the different ownership structures of companies. 
Indeed, by looking at the figures below, it is evident that companies operating within consumer 
services, oil and gas and telecommunications industries tend to appoint on average the highest 
number of minority directors, indeed equal to 3. At the same time, finance and health sectors 
appoint the lowest numbers, on average equal to 1.33 and 1 respectively.  
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This result points out that the election of minority representatives on boards, on average, is not 
linked with board size. If that was the case, it would have been reasonable to expect a larger 
number of appointed minority directors in companies characterized by larger boards. However, 
empirical evidence with respect to the finance sector shows exactly the opposite relation: with 
an average board size of 16 members, only 1, on average is representative of minorities. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: average number of minority directors by industry and ultimate owner 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
With respect to the most significant types of ultimate owners, Government-held corporations 
appoint on average the highest number of minority directors. Furthermore, in the great majority 
of state-owned companies (six out of nine2) both slates, presented by minority and majority 
shareholders, always appoint all candidates. Hence, the non-elected category is not present for 
either majority or minority groups. In these cases, it is reasonable to assume that lists are 
prepared strategically in accordance with company bylaws provisions establishing the optimal 
number of directors to be appointed.  
 
Elected directors own on average 1.28 qualifications, an exactly equal amount to the average 
number of qualifications owned by the total sample of candidates. Also, for elected boards the 
most diffused study background across directors is the economic, directly followed by legal and 
scientific studies.  
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Also, by looking at the distribution of skills across elected boards, it is possible to observe that 
the most represented skills categories are the ones previously identified for candidates. 
Hence, in all elected boards during the period 2014-2016, at least one appointed director has: 
industry, financial and accounting expertise, international, as well as management and 
governance experience. While human resources and risk management skills are represented 
within boards only in the 37% of cases.   
 
 
Figure 4.11: skill categories representation by company 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
 
The average skill representation of companies in the sample is equal to 10.87, and it furthermore 
range from a minimum value of 7 to a maximum of 14, representing the whole set of possible 
skills identified. Analysing the average skill representation by industry, it is possible to observe 
that the industry presenting the highest skills average, equal to 12.50, is the one of consumer 
















Figure 4.12: average skill representation by industry 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
By looking at the distribution of companies by number of represented skills, it is possible to 
observe that the greatest portion of companies, equal to 20 out of 30, has represented within the 
board 11 and 12 skills. Only one is representative of all the 14 skill categories and belong to the 
consumer services industry. 
 
Figure 4.13: number of companies by skill representation and industry 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
With respect to elected candidates’ average skills, the great majority of boards present elected 
directors with higher skills both for majority and minority groups. Only in few cases, the 
elected-majority candidates are characterized by a lower amount of skills, with respect to the 
non-elected counterparty. In only one company, (Generali Assicurazioni S.p.a.) both non-
elected majority and minority candidates present a higher skill average.  
 
 



























4.4 Potential issue: same candidates across more lists 
By analysing candidates’ profiles, it has been found out that few individuals stand for director 
offices in several companies. More specifically, across the three-year period analysed, there are 
33 individuals3 presented as candidates by more lists: 30 individuals run for the office in two 
companies, 2 in three, and 1 in four. But why a candidate might be proposed for the same office 
in more companies?  
A possible and straightforward explanation lies in the potential existence of links between 
companies, as for example a relation of control. By comparing the ownership structures of firms 
in which candidates are simultaneously proposed, it has been possible to identify twelve cases 
of such relations. More specifically, in three cases the companies shared the same ultimate 
owners, in the remaining nine instead, it was possible to identify a relation of “control” either 
achieved through ownership rights or through shareholder agreements.  
 
Another potential explanation to the recurrence of the same candidates across different 
companies, could be found by looking at their skills. It is indeed possible that more skilled 
individuals are presented in more companies given their superior capabilities or expertise. In 
fact, candidates in more than one company have on average 3.52 skills, slightly higher than the 
same data representative of the total sample, and equal to 3.10 average skills4. At the same time, 
the same group of candidates hold an average number of qualifications equal to 1.09, indeed 
lower than 1.28, which represent the average number of titles held by the whole sample of 462 
candidates. Hence, it is possible to say that, besides the slightly lower level of education, those 
candidates are probably considered more expert, particularly almost all appear to be 
experienced as directors and managers (31 and 24 respectively, out of the total of 33).   
 
In addition, it is fundamental to underline that, of the 33 candidates simultaneously proposed 
in several companies, 21 are representative of majorities, while 3 of minorities lists. However, 
the remaining 9 candidates are representatives of both groups: indeed, proposed in lists 
submitted either by majority and minority shareholders, across different companies. This means 
that the same candidate is simultaneously present in the majority and minority group of 
candidates analysed. In order to ensure consistency of results, the same analysis previously 
performed has been conducted excluding these nine individuals. In this way, it is possible to 
avoid double counting the same information regarding the same candidates, thus creating 
 
3 More detailed information regarding candidates and related lists are provided in the appendix (table 3). 
4 In this case the average number of skills has been computed by excluding the company business skill, because it 
is related and indeed variable according to the specific company. 
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majority and minority subsets only composed by majority and minority representatives, 
respectively. Results of this further analysis, mainly with respect to general information, 
independence and level of information disclosure, are not particularly different from the ones 
previously described. However, with respect to the level of education and of skills, the general 
observation is of a further flattening of the already mild differences between minority and 
majority candidates’ profiles.  
 
Figure 4.14: majority and minority average skills across the two analysis 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
This slight levelling is mainly driven by minorities, while the values for the majority subset 
appear more stable. The most significant example is given by the reduction of average skills of 
minorities from a value of 3.73 to 3.68, which is indeed equal to the average number of skills 
possessed by majority candidates.  
 
Hence, according to this result, it is possible to say that the nine eliminated candidates’ profiles, 
characterized by a particularly high skills average (4.1), were indeed the one creating, at least 
for what concern skills level, a slight distinction between the two analysed subsets. Their 
elimination causes the slight differences to flatten.  
 
4.5 Results discussion 
The empirical analysis conducted has pointed out the impossibility to identify significant 
differences across minority and majority candidate’s profiles.  
The great majority of candidates, of either the two groups, is more representative of the male 


















55-56 years old. Furthermore, only slight and indeed not significant differences are observable 
with respect to their level of education and average skills possessed.  
The overall lack of significant differences across candidates’ profiles, particularly with respect 
to the skill variables, means that the initial assumption according to which minority directors 
would have brought to the board unique capabilities or higher skills is on average not adequately 
supported by this empirical analysis. Hence, the introduction of minority slates does not seem 
beneficial, at least in terms of a diverse skill representation on boards.  
 
However, when considering also the distinction between elected and non-elected candidates’ 
profiles, it seems that on average the most skilled and expert candidates are indeed appointed 
on boards. Hence, testifying an overall adequate implementation of board election mechanisms, 
ensuring that directors are appointed on the base of their skills, experiences and other relevant 
characteristics.  
 
Even if candidates’ profiles do not differ significantly across general data, independence, skills 
and education, an element of more significant variation can be found with respect to the 
information disclosure variable, in other words, in the level of information candidates provide 
within their curricula. Particularly, minority candidates, in almost the 100% of cases, provide a 
higher level of information by submitting detailed curricula able to effectively describe their 
previous experiences, backgrounds, skills and capabilities. On the other hand, majority 
candidates, in particular in cases of previous appointment on the same board, or in the cases in 
which they do not qualify as independent, provide on average fewer information.  
 
The variation in the level of information disclosure represent a potential issue both for the 
analysis conducted, as well as at a more general level.  
With respect to the first point, the inequality of disclosure represents an important finding, but 
at the same time a potential limitation. If candidates’ curricula have not the same structures and 
do not provide the same types of information, with the same level of details, it becomes 
extremely difficult to objectively value candidates in relation to their skills and to make then a 
subsequent reliable comparison, given the initial inequality of data.  
 
At the same time, the variation in the level of disclosure between candidates might represent a 
potential issue in the context of board election: how is it possible to judge potential directors’ 
skills and expertise if they do not provide the same information, or an equal level of details with 
respect to the same shared information? 
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Consequently, the potential issue companies face is to appoint directors considering aspects 
different from their knowledge and experience. This might cause the risk of excluding 
candidates, either minority or majority representatives, who could bring value added resources 
to the board and to the entire company.  
 
In relation to this topic, it could be probably useful to introduce “best practices” or charter 
provisions able to formalize and address this potential issue. For instance, the introduction of a 
unique standard format of curriculum or candidate presentation for each company, could 
partially solve the problem, at least allowing for a comparison across candidates within the 
same company. Furthermore, there are countries, like USA, which have introduced regulatory 
measures regarding directors’ information disclosure. More specifically, the 2009 amendment 
to Regulation S-K requires public companies to describe the reasons why directors have been 
appointed. More specifically, companies need to “briefly discuss the specific experience, 
qualifications, attributes or skills that led to the conclusion that the person should serve as a 
director” (Adams et al., 2018). This kind or rule has two major benefits: firstly, it forces 
companies to appoint their directors on the base of their skills and of value-added resources 
they can bring to the company, secondly it makes necessary for directors the disclosure of 
certain specific information in order to be selected as company directors. Hence, it could be 
reasonable to assume that the implementation of a similar rule would on one hand provide more 
relevance to directors’ skills in the board election process, and as a consequence, it forces 
directors to disclose more detailed information in order to be appointed on the board.  
 
Given that no significant differences were found among majority and minority candidates’ 
profiles, the subsequent step of analysis, regarding the potential effect of those differences on 
companies’ performance, has not been performed. However, given the extreme relevance of 
board composition, it would also be interesting to assess potential relations between board 
composition in terms of skills and performance. In fact, when aggregating data regarding skills 
at board level, it is possible to observe some elements of variation between the elected and non-
elected groups. According to the analysis performed, the skill which has been found to vary 
most in the elected/non-elected setting is the finance and accounting one. For instance, there 
are boards in which only few elected directors possess financial and accounting expertise, while 
the majority of non-elected candidates possess the cited skill. According to this finding, some 
companies seem renouncing to specific skills of their potential directors. Within this context, 
further analysis on Italian listed companies could investigate what are the reasons of this choice, 







































Agency problems might be detrimental for firm value and performance, as well as for the 
overall functioning and development of capital markets. Given the potential negative 
consequences arising with agency issues, companies and related regulations have always tried 
to implement and introduce several relief mechanisms. Particularly, the board of directors 
represents the main governance instrument able to mitigate the agency general issue in all its 
major declinations. Indeed, it is viewed as the major link between shareholders and 
management, and when allowing for minority shareholders representation, as a “platform” 
through which potential conflicts between shareholders might be solved.  
 
Hence, given the extreme relevance of minority representation within boards in providing 
minorities with the satisfaction and safeguard of their interests, the thesis has been focused on 
the analysis of the Italian minority representation system, defined as list voting. Considering a 
sample of 40 Italian listed companies, it has been pointed out that in one-fourth of companies, 
minorities chose to not submit their slates of candidates. This choice coincides with highly 
concentrated ownership structures, in which the ultimate owners are identified with individuals 
or families, owning in most cases more than 50% of companies’ ordinary shares. Hence, it is 
possible to underline a negative relation between minority shareholder activism and controlling 
ownership: the higher the controlling owners’ power, the lower the minority interests in actively 
participate and influence the board activities.  
 
Moving from the starting assumptions that minority representation is fundamental to reduce 
agency costs, and that it can also enhance board diversity, the scope of the thesis was to assess 
whether minority shareholders representatives, hence potential minority directors, differ from 
majority ones. The comparison between the two pools of candidates, shaped across several 
variables (gender, age, nationality, level and background of education, and skills possessed), 
has not pointed out significant differences.  
 
Even though minority candidates are not found to be “diverse” with respect to their profiles, 
they significantly differ in relation to the level of information disclosed within their 
presentations and curricula. Minority candidates always provide detailed information regarding 
their general data, study and work background, current positions, skills and capabilities 
developed. While, majority candidates, in particular in cases of non-independence or of re-
appointment, only provide few and general information. This finding, even if not directly 
connected with the research question, points out the potential need of company measures which 
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might implement a more equal disclosure of candidates’ information, hence making possible a 




































Table 1: final sample 
 
 
Company Market index Market capitalization Industry
a2a S.p.a. FTSE MIB 5.340.000 Utilities
Acea S.p.a. FTSE Mid Cap 3.970.000 Utilities
Amplifon S.p.a. FTSE MIB 5.960.000 Health
Astm S.p.a. FTSE Mid Cap 2.540.000 Industrials
Atlantia S.p.a. FTSE MIB 17.530.000 Industrials
Autogrill S.p.a. FTSE Mid Cap 2.390.000 Consumer services
Azimut Holding S.p.a. FTSE MIB 3.330.000 Finance
Banca Generali S.p.a. FTSE Mid Cap 3.490.000 Finance
Brembo S.p.a. FTSE Mid Cap 3.650.000 Consumer goods
Brunello Cucinelli S.p.a. FTSE Mid Cap 2.210.000 Consumer goods
Buzzi Unicem S.p.a. FTSE MIB 4.460.000 Industrials
Campari S.p.a. FTSE MIB 9.420.000 Consumer goods
Diasorin S.p.a. FTSE MIB 6.450.000 Health
De' Longhi S.p.a. FTSE Mid Cap 2.790.000 Consumer goods
Enel S.p.a. FTSE MIB 75.800.000 Utilities
Eni S.p.a. FTSE MIB 50.780.000 Oil and Gas
Erg S.p.a. FTSE Mid Cap 2.860.000 Utilities
Generali Assicurazioni S.p.a. FTSE MIB 29.230.000 Finance
Hera S.p.a. FTSE MIB 5.670.000 Utilities
I.M.A. S.p.a. FTSE Mid Cap 2.580.000 Industrials
Interpump Group S.p.a. FTSE Mid Cap 2.870.000 Industrials
Iren S.p.a. FTSE Mid Cap 3.680.000 Utilities
Juventus FC S.p.a. FTSE MIB 1.680.000 Consumer services
Leonardo S.p.a. FTSE MIB 6.490.000 Industrials
Mediaset S.p.a. FTSE Mid Cap 3.050.000 Consumer services
Mediobanca S.p.a. FTSE MIB 8.640.000 Finance
Moncler S.p.a. FTSE MIB 10.340.000 Consumer goods
Pirelli & C S.p.a. FTSE MIB 5.310.000 Consumer goods
Prysmian S.p.a. FTSE MIB 5.650.000 Industrials
Recordati S.p.a. FTSE MIB 7.960.000 Health
Reply S.p.a. FTSE Mid Cap 2.680.000 Technology
Saipem S.p.a. FTSE MIB 4.410.000 Oil and Gas
Salvatore Ferragamo S.p.a. FTSE MIB 3.230.000 Consumer goods
Sias S.p.a. FTSE Mid Cap 3.490.000 Industrials
Snam S.p.a. FTSE MIB 17.750.000 Oil and Gas
Telecom Italia S.p.a. FTSE MIB 11.060.000 Telecommunications
Terna-Rete Elettrica Nazionale S.p.a. FTSE MIB 12.220.000 Utilities
Unicredit S.p.a. FTSE MIB 30.040.000 Finance
Unipol S.p.a. FTSE MIB 3.640.000 Finance





Table 2: FTSE MIB excluded companies  
Reason for exclusion Company 
Not incorporated in Italy 
Cnh Industrial N.V., Exor N.V., Ferrari 
N.V., Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V., 
STMicroelectronics N.V., Tenaris S.A. 
Data unavailability Banco Bpm S.p.a., Finecobank S.p.a., Nexi 
S.p.a., Poste Italiane S.p.a. 
One-tier system Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.a., Ubi Banca S.p.a. 
M&A and restructuring activities BPER Banca S.p.a., Italgas S.p.a. 
 
 N.V. (naamloze vennootschap) companies are incorporated in the Netherlands and basically 
represents the equivalent of the Italian S.p.a. The S.A. typology, is an autonomous society, 
incorporated in Luxembourg.  
Banco BPM S.p.a. was created in 2017, while FinecoBank S.p.a., Poste Italiane S.p.a. and Nexi 
S.p.a. were admitted to the Stock exchange in 2014, 2015 and 2019 respectively.  
At the same time, BPER Banca only became an S.p.a. at the end of 2016 and Italgas S.p.a. 




























Tarak Ben Ammar Mediobanca S.p.a. Telecom S.p.a.
Gilberto Benetton Atlantia S.p.a. Autogrill S.p.a. Mediobanca S.p.a.
Francesco Berardini Unipol S.p.a. Unipol Sai S.p.a.
Sabrina Bruno Snam S.p.a. Unipol Sai S.p.a.
Lucia Calvosa Telecom S.p.a. Unipol Sai S.p.a.
Stefano Cao a2a S.p.a. Saipem S.p.a.
Maria Elena Cappello a2a S.p.a. Prysmian S.p.a. Saipem S.p.a. Telecom S.p.a.
Michaela Castelli a2a S.p.a. Recordati S.p.a.
Paolo Cattabiani Unipol S.p.a. Unipol Sai S.p.a.
Giovanni Cavallini Brembo S.p.a. Campari S.p.a.
Fabio Cerchiai Atlantia S.p.a. Unipol Sai S.p.a.
Carlo Cimbri Unipol S.p.a. Unipol Sai S.p.a.
Ernesto Dalle Rive Unipol S.p.a. Unipol Sai S.p.a.
Maurizio Dattilo Generali Ass. S.p.a. Telecom S.p.a.
Luigi De Paoli a2a S.p.a. Unipol Sai S.p.a.
Monica De Virgiliis Prysmian S.p.a. Snam S.p.a.
Paolo Di Benedetto Acea S.p.a. Generali Ass. S.p.a.
Philippe Donnet Banca Generali S.p.a. Generali Ass. S.p.a.
Laura Donnini Amplifon S.p.a. Moncler S.p.a.
Giovanna Dossena Brembo S.p.a. Mediaset S.p.a.
Gabriele Galateri di Genola Generali Ass. S.p.a. Moncler S.p.a.
Maria Patrizia Grieco Amplifon S.p.a. Enel S.p.a.
Massimo Lapucci Atlantia S.p.a. Banca Generali S.p.a.
Elisabetta Magistretti Mediobanca S.p.a. Pirelli & C. S.p.a.
Silvia Merlo Erg S.p.a. Leonardo S.p.a.
Gianni Mion Atlantia S.p.a. Autogrill S.p.a.
Diva Moriani Eni S.p.a. Generali Ass. S.p.a. Moncler S.p.a.
Nicla Picchi Saipem S.p.a. Unipol Sai S.p.a.
Paolo Pietrogrande Iren S.p.a. Pirelli & C. S.p.a.
Paolo Roverato Atlantia S.p.a. Autogrill S.p.a.
Pierluigi Stefanini Unipol S.p.a. Unipol Sai S.p.a.
Giovanni Tamburi Amplifon S.p.a. Prysmian S.p.a.
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Pirelli &C. S.p.a., 2014: Lista 1 CAMFIN S.p.a. 
       Lista 2 Investitori 




Prysmian S.p.a., 2015: Lista 1 Consiglio di Amministrazione 
     Lista 2 Clubtre S.p.a. 





Recordati S.p.a., 2014: Lista 1 FIMEI S.p.a. 
     Lista 2 Torre SS 
            https://www.recordati.it/it/investors/assemblee_degli_azionisti/2014/ 
 
 
Saipem S.p.a., 2015: Lista 1 ENI S.p.a. 





Sias S.p.a., 2014: Lista 1 ASTM S.p.a. 




Snam S.p.a., 2016: Lista 1 CDP Reti S.p.a. 
          Lista 2 Inarcassa 







Telecom S.p.a., 2014: Lista 1 Telco S.p.a. 
    Lista 2 Findim SA 
    Lista 3 SGR e Investitori istituzionali 




Terna S.p.a., 2014: Lista 1 Cassa depositi e prestiti  
          Lista 2 Investitori  
        https://www.terna.it/it/Governance/assemblea-azionisti 
 
 
Unicredit S.p.a., 2015: Lista 1 Allianz S.p.a.; AABAR; Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio 
    Torino; Carimonte Holding S.p.a., Fincal S.p.a., Cofimar S.r.l. 





Unipol S.p.a., 2016: Lista 1 Finsoe S.p.a. 
            Lista 2 SGR e Investitori istituzionali 
          http://www.unipol.it/it/governance/assemblee-degli-azionisti 
 
 
Unipol Sai S.p.a., 2016: Lista 1 Unipol S.p.a. 
       Lista 2 Azionisti di minoranza  
http://www.unipolsai.com/it/governance/assemblee-degli-azionisti 
 




         
